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Bringing People Back: Toward A
Comprehensive Theory Of Taking
In Natural Resources Law
William H Rodgers, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary legal theory, at times, seems to have degenerated
into a contest of false modeling. The still popular economic analysis,'
on the one hand, assumes a person who is a rational maximizer of self-
interest bearing scant resemblance to the thinkers and actors known to
social investigators. 2 A principal competitor to economic analysis in
the law schools is the contract justice theory of John Rawls,3 who posits
a state of nature, and a calculated social compact stemming from it,
that is utterly at odds with what paleoanthropology knows of the evolu-
tion of the human species.4 One of the lingering dissatisfactions with
* William H. Rodgers, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Washington. For the title,
the author is indebted to Homans, Bringing Men Back In, 29 AM. Soc. REV. 809 (1964).
Appreciation is expressed to my colleagues Stewart Jay, Arval Morris, and William
Stoebuck for comments on a draft of this paper.
1. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977); Symposium an
Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980). A normative version of the
economic theory of law appears in Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, andLegal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUDIES 103 (1979).
2. See, e.g., H. LEIBERSTEIN, BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN: A NEW FOUNDATION FOR
MICROECONOMICS (1976); C. LUMSDEN & E. 0. WILSON, GENES, MIND, AND CULTURE:
THE COEVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 86-92 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LUMSDEN & WILSON];
Simon, The Behavioral and Social Sciences, 209 SCIENCE 72, 75 (1980).
3. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
4. Holden, The Politics of Paleoanthropology, 213 SCIENCE 737 (1981). See also J.
BONNER, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE IN ANIMALS (1980); Carneiro, 4 Theory fthe Ori-
gin ofthe State, 169 SCIENCE 733 (1970). There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that the
human species was living as a social animal long before the biological development of the
intellectual capacities presupposed by contract theories of justice. According to this view,
social rules, law, and governments preceded the human capacity to enter into social com-
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comprehensive theories of this sort is that they invoke versions of
human nature, whether grasping maximizer or fairminded noble, that
are built around behavioral assumptions describing people greatly un-
like the people we know.
This Article attempts to bring people back into legal analysis by
drawing upon behavioral preferences of human beings suggested by the
laws of biology.5 Biological theory offers no all-encompassing explana-
tions of legal outcomes, although it offers important, and much ne-
glected, partial explanations. That the law can be explained in this
light suggests that courts have a view of human nature departing from
the caricatures of much contemporary legal theory.
We take as our setting an issue faced by each society in every
era-property rights in natural resources. Part I takes up the task of
theory development by recanvassing property theory and assigning spe-
cial importance to four prominent themes-biological and social func-
tionary explanations, the concept of natural resource rights in common,
and the process component of property rights definition. The ideas de-
veloped include the human property right, which is inalienable except
upon terms of the holder, and provisional rights to the common stock
of natural resources, called social property, representing wealth that
may be reallocated without compensation. These themes constitute the
basis of a comprehensive theory of property. All four of the theoretical
themes are amply represented in historical justifications of property,
and one would expect these themes to reappear in contemporary legal
doctrine governing actual property conflicts.
6
Part II tests this comprehensive theory against legal experience in
the natural resources field.7 Used for this purpose are the statutes and
case law addressing a variety of resource conflicts in five different doc-
pacts. See J. JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BICAM-
ERAL MIND (1976); D. JOHANSON & M. EDEY, LucY: THE BEGINNINGS OF HUMANKIND
(1981).
5. E. 0. Wilson defines sociobiology as "the systematic study of the biological basis of
all social behavior." SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 4 (1975). A full bibliography is
found in LUMSDEN & WILSON, supra note 2, at 305-415. For the views of a philosopher and
political scientist, respectively, see P. SINGER, THE EXPANDING CIRCLE: ETHICS AND SOCI-
OBIOLOGY (198 1) and A. ROSENBERG, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE PREEMPTION OF SOCIAL SCI-
ENCE (1980).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 224-25. It is at the point of confirmation theory
that normative social science is severely impoverished. In the physical sciences, theory is
descriptive, and accurate observation will confirm or disprove. In normative social science,
such as much law review analysis, the practice is to accept some observations as confirma-
tory and discard others as being incompatible and wrong. This is by no means confirmation,
of course; it is simply a comparison of apriori suppositions with real world observations.
The persuasiveness of the normative theory still depends on the appeal of its apriori ration-
ale. The theory presented here is offered as descriptive theory, so the notions of confirma-
tion or invalidation make sense. See infra notes 52 & 66.
7. See infra notes 53-223 and accompanying text.
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trinal settings-nuisance and takings law, waste, and the reserved
rights and public trust doctrines. These doctrines define crucial rela-
tionships among people, and between people and their collective repre-
sentatives. In testing the theory articulated here, a subsidiary purpose
of this Article is to develop a taking theory offering descriptive gui-
dance for the law of natural resource wealth allocation.8
These doctrines, dealing as they do with resource conflict, all are
closely related to classical nuisance law; the discussion is organized
around the ideas of spatial conflict (disputes between neighbors and
other contemporaneous contestants for the same resource) and tempo-
ral conflict (disputes between different users of the same resources over
time, typified by the law of waste, reserved rights, and public trust).
The discussion in Part II singles out for attention some selected issues,
elaborating and extending the introductory discussion of Part I.9
The property arrangements emerging from the analysis that fol-
lows can be stated simply. A property rights holder may possess three
types of property: a core "human" property, which may be taken only
upon the terms of the holder; private property or entitlements that may
be taken only with compensation; and a "social" or provisional prop-
erty interest in the resource commons, which may be redefined to the
detriment of the holder without compensation. All property interest
losers, including holders of provisional rights, are accorded process
protections against attempts to diminish or redefine their resource
holdings.
The takings test suggested by the analysis is as follows. First, the
8. This article will not pursue the "public use" issue in takings law; for a general
overview of that issue, see Meidinger, The "'Public Uses" of Emient Domain." History and
Policy, 11 ENv. LAW 1 (1980).
9. In graphic terms the doctrines covered by this Article are:
Public Reserved
Nuisance Takings Trust Rights Law of
Doctrine Law Doctrine Doctrine Waste
Biological
ThemeThuma Yes Yes Yes Yes(human
property)
Social
Functionary Yes Yes
Theme (social
property)
Common
Property Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theme (social
property)
Process
Rights Yes Yes Yes Yes
Theme
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core "human" property is protected from invasion by substantive due
process limits on legislative power. Second, compensation is required
when a government improves its own wealth position by taking over
private entitlements. The test requires a search for official advantage.
Finally, legislatures have considerable freedom to reallocate "social"
property, with or without payment to the losers. The choice of com-
pensation is a matter of policy rather than constitutional necessity.
I
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NATURAL RESOURCES: GUIDANCE
FROM PROPERTY THEORY
Past inquiries into the nature of property disclose four theoretical
themes offering criteria for allocating natural resource wealth-biologi-
cal influence, social function, common property, and process right.
These themes are derived from a variety of disciplines, and invoke both
empirical assertion and a priori assumption. Much of the theoretical
support is normative, in that acceptance of the "conclusions depends
upon acceptance of the values behind them. We are engaged at this
point, however, not in attempts at evaluation but only in a historical
surve ' of property theory argumentation.
A. Biological Theories: A Touch of Absolutism
In one important regard, "private" property has been viewed as an
extension of the person. This is understandable, for since the begin-
nings of civilization people have engaged in the resource use, posses-
sion and consumption that characterizes human existence. They
occupied space, breathed air, and appropriated energy needed to sus-
tain life. The notion of occupancy, or needed breathing space, is a cen-
tral perception of this early view of property. Naturally one could only
possess what one could occupy and use.' 0
Space and territorial needs of animals long have been recog-
nized,II and biologists have identified similar needs in humans. 12 The
reasons for these needs are many, including maintenance of a food
base, provision of security and identity, and protection of privacy. The
space demanded includes microspace, a mobile bubble of personal ju-
10. See the discussion of fitness suppression in human society, in LUMSDEN & WILSON,
supra note 2, at 297-98. Compare the point made forcefully by Rousseau, commenting on
the practice of European explorers to appropriate by declaration, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
20-21, bk. I, chap: ix (1959) ("On such a showing... the Catholic King need only take
possession, from his apartment, of the whole universe, merely making a subsequent reserva-
tion of what was already in the possession" of others).
11. See, e.g., K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966).
12. R. DUBOS, MAN ADAPTING 108 (1965); see E. 0. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE
107-10 (1978); Dyson-Hudson & Smith, Human Territoriality, 80 AMERICAN ANTHROPOLO-
GIST 21 (1978).
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risdiction, and mesospace, the home base. A home is an area in which
an individual has made an investment, and which is actively defended
as a place of "sure refuge."' 13 Human commitments, to be sure, may
extend outward-to neighborhood, community, and beyond-but the
bedrock for the individual is the home.
Closely related to occupancy concepts of property are "personal-
ity" theories, which for "the most part proceed from psychological per-
ceptions, whether intuitive or empirically based, of a human proclivity
to identify the self with its possessions and thus to experience from a
loss of possession the anguish of intimate personal loss."'1 4 This is a
psychological justification of property, and the human need it repre-
sents is documented regularly by vehement defenses of right against
utilitarian-justified policies of ouster. 15 This link between person and
place is now an important consideration in contemporary architecture
and urban design, which stress that surroundings are intimately tied to
the enjoyment of life. 16
The best known variation of the personality theory of property is
Locke's celebrated labor theory, which holds that people are entitled to
what they produce by their own initiative, intelligence, and efforts.
This theory starts from a premise of entitlement in one's own body
(everyone "has a property in his own person; this nobody has a right to
but himself")17 and carries over to natural things made more useful by
one's efforts.' 8 Locke's ideas have a number of problems, but they
carry a powerful root appeal. It is not transparently unfair to accept as
a postulate nature's allocation of human endowments, 19 or to honor
13. J. PORTEOUS, ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR: PLANNING AND EVERYDAY URBAN
LIFE 61-62 (1976); see E. 0. WILSON, supra note 12, at 107 ("territories contain an 'invinci-
be center.' The resident animal defends the territory far more vigorously than intruders
who attempt to usurp it, and as a result the defender usually wins. In a special sense, it has
the 'moral advantage' over trespassers."). On a legislative zone of noninterference, see H.
ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 60-67 (1958); T. MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION 154-75 (1980).
14. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"'ust Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1205 (1967).
15. Illustrative cases include the vehement tribal opposition to the proposed divestiture
of Indian treaty fishing rights, see generally notes 165-80 infra and accompanying text; Po-
lish-American resistance to the renovation of downtown Detroit, see Wash. Post, June 1,
1981, col. 1, and numerous other instances where people ousted by public policy cling to
their holdings with determined if pitiable insistence. See also Michelman, Property as a
Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097 (1981).
16. See J. PORTEOUS, supra note 13, at 61-89.
17. L. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 33 (1977) (quoting Locke, Two Treatises on Govern-
ment, 2nd treatise, 27).
18. Id. at 33, 48-56.
19. See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 123-24, 129-33 (1980);
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered:
The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 16-21 (1980). On the
importance of environmental endowments to cultural development, see R. DuBos, So
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what a person earns as a result. These claims of personal desert are but
modest extensions of the values accidentally bestowed upon individuals
by the genetic lottery.20
Locke in his own time was beset with questions about resource
limits-what happens after several generations of Robinson Crusoes
have appropriated all tillable land by annexing "labor" to it?21 In re-
sponse, Locke engrafted a less well-known proviso to his basic labor
theory: appropriation of land by labor can proceed at least where there
is "still enough and as good" left in common for others and where eve-
ryone takes only what they can use.22 Of course allocation is never a
problem until appropriation approaches the limits of available re-
sources. Still, the modesty of the entitlement endorsed by Locke de-
serves emphasis; it takes no account of wealth accumulated other than
by the sweat of one's brow and is prepared to forbid even hard-charg-
ing merit claimants from fencing the commons to the detriment of
others who come to the table too late or who are encumbered by their
natural limitations. 23 The Lockean proviso (approving labor-related
appropriations only where there is "enough and as good left in com-
mon for others") is a stark reminder, as L.T. Hobhouse has told us, that
"ethical individualism in property, carried through, blows up its own
citadel."'24 What is a "justification of property" becomes a "reproba-
tion of riches" when the social system concentrates wealth and denies
its citizens the kind and amount of wealth needed to develop fully their
personalities. 25
Lockean theory has influenced strongly American property law. It
is best described as an extension-of-the-person biological theory. The
cabin, the game, or the crop belongs to the one who built it, captured it,
or nurtured it. This is a merit theory. Wealth is bestowed upon the one
HUMAN AN ANIMAL 47-48 (1968). For further discussion, see J. GARDINER, EXCELLENCE
(1961).
20. See R. SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY 151-61 (1951).
21. Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government,
in E. BARKER, SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, § 33. See general4 id., §§ 25-51.
22. Id., §§ 31 ("Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy"); 37 ("if the
fruits rotted or the venison putrified before he could spend it, he offended against the com-
mon law of nature"); 46.
23. S. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA 174-82 (1974).
24. L. HOBHOUSE, The Historical Evolution ofProperty, In Fact and In Idea, in PROP-
ERTY, ITS DUTIES AND RIGHTS 1, 29 (1913).
25. Id. at 28-29. The Lockean proviso is alive and well in international dialogue today.
Strong distributional concerns of underdeveloped nations have been largely responsible for
assurances in written agreements that the resources of Antarctica, the oceans, and the moon,
are the "common heritage of mankind." The phrase "common heritage of mankind," as it is
used in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, is taken from G. A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). See Newlin, An Alternative Legal
Mechanismfor Deep Sea Mining, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 257, 258 n.5 (1980); Kotz, "The Com-
mon Heritage of Mankind:" Resource Management of the International Seabed, 6 ECOL-
OGY L. Q. 65 (1976).
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who earns it, not in response to the dictates of historical entitlements or
the sympathies of public charity.
While this sketchy account is not the whole story of property justi-
fication in the United States today, it suggests some little-noticed
dimensions of a comprehensive takings theory. First, a biologically-
justified property theory is strongly rights-oriented. It hints at limits of
human manipulability. The honoring of property intimately tied to the
person-say, the lifelong residence--evokes questions not about
whether its taking should be attended by a "just" compensation, but
rather about whether it should be taken at all. If tearing down the roof
over someone's head is a psychological battery, deep and irreparable,
has society made amends by offering a "just" compensation? Surely
the state would have difficulty justifying the condemnation of an "un-
needed" eye or kidney from one of its citizens, even while offering
monetary recompense and in generous pursuit of a program to aid the
handicapped. The classical understanding of a property right, of
course, is not a right to sell at a mandated compensation but a right to
sell at the owner's price if one exists. 26 All of this suggests that biologi-
cal property theory may be more useful in defining what can be taken
than in determining whether compensation should be paid.
A second dimension of biological property theories, perhaps a re-
flection of circumstances throughout early history, is that the property
respected is that won by human effort unaided to any substantial de-
gree by slavery or by technology. This emphasizes the close link be-
tween biologically-justified property and its owner, as manifested by
the personality, possession, and labor theories. A hardcore Lockean
labor theory justifies wealth accumulated by personal merit and effort,
not by human slavery or energy holdings.
Third, biological theories, by original assumption and function,
anticipate limits on the extent to which nature's wealth can be appro-
priated by acquisitive humans. Wealth accumulation is restricted by
the biological realities advanced as justification and by the comparable
claims of others. These appropriation barriers are acknowledged by
the Lockean proviso, and are often expressed as an obligation to main-
tain a "commons" for latecomers, about which more will be said
below. 27
26. See Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. Guest ed.
1961); Calabresi & Melamud, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability.- One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Cf. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of
Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 387-88 (1978) (discussing the "fundamental rights" protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause).
27. See infra Part IC.
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B. Social Functionary Theories." A Touch of Utilitarianism
A second group of property theories can be described by a social
functionary rationale. Classical economist Irving Fisher defined prop-
erty as a right to obtain future services from an article of wealth, and
wealth as simply something owned by human beings. 28 People may not
be moved to create (or lay claim to) wealth, however, unless they are
rewarded for their efforts, and thus the assignment of property rights is
a means of bringing together human, financial, and natural resources to
increase production. Professor Michelman points out that one interpre-
tation of Locke's views
is that production at any level sufficient to advance consumption be-
yond what will support the crudest kind of subsistence requires plan-
ning, foresight, and organization in the employment of resources;
requires, that is to say, saving, capital formation, investment, and man-
agement, all of which it is supposed could not occur without
ownership.29
The utilitarians, notably David Hume and Jeremy Bentham, defended
private property as a means of achieving human happiness. Property
became a "basis of expectations" necessary to encourage the will to
labor and invest. 30 Many property rationales in vogue today refine and
extend these utilitarian considerations by asserting that private prop-
erty rights encourage risk-taking and experimentation, prompt invest-
ment, furnish incentives to internalize spillovers, and facilitate
exchange and associated gains. 31
Social functionary theories, perhaps even more than the strictly
biological theories, invoke a variety of debatable assumptions about
what motivates people to plan, work, and invest. 32 If expectations are
decisive, then thieves should not be deprived of their ill-gotten gains; if
the goal is to attract capital and inspire labor, then the government
never should depreciate private values without compensation; if social
demoralization caused by income transfer is the problem, then pay-
ment should be made to obviate it. These utilitarian justifications, read
28. I. FISHER, THE NATURE OF CAPITAL AND INCOME 3-6, 53 (1906).
29. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1207.
30. Id. at 1211-12. Another plausible empirical assumption is that high tax rates en-
courage one to work harder to make up the difference.
31. See Anderson & Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights.: A Study of the American
West, 18 J. L. & EcON. 163, 178 (1975) ("a comparison of the benefits and costs of defining
and enforcing property rights explains and predicts the evolution of property institutions");
Cheung, The Structure ofa Contract and the Theory ofa Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J. LAW
& ECON. 49 (1970); Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347,
354 (1967) ("property rights arise when it becomes economic for those affected by externali-
ties to internalize benefits and costs").
32. See, e.g., Kennedy & Michelman, ,4re Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 771 (1980) (discussing economic justifications of the legal institution of private
property).
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into the taking clause, could be invoked to justify a rigid maintenance
of income. Far from being committed to rigidity, however, utilitarian-
ism has two overarching features suggesting great latitude in effecting
uncompensated wealth transfers or cash substitutes for specific hold-
ings. The first is that, in calculating the overall "human happiness"
associated with any property arrangement, the utility to the rights
holder may be outweighed by the utilities of others. This conditional
nature of utility-justified entitlements makes any property assignment
susceptible to redefinition in response to the changing values of other
people, even as they may extend to non-human interests of nature. A
second feature of utilitarian definitions of property is that they reflect
empirical judgments about what rights assignment will lead to the
greatest good or the most happiness or the highest benefits.
There are thus two dynamic features of a socially justified property
law that must be accounted for-human value changes and shifting
empirical assumptions about the extent to which expectations should be
honored to get the most out of available resources. Utilitarian property
theory tells us little about drawing the line between compensable and
noncompensable takings, but it raises questions that have important
process implications. The questions posed about the propriety of tak-
ing this "utilitarian" property are legislative in character, calling for a
communitywide assessment of costs and benefits. They require judg-
ments about whether the trimming of expected values will boomerang
by damaging incentives. These questions differ distinctly from the in-
quiries suggested by biological theories, which focus upon individual-
ized needs served by "human" property. 33
It is true, moreover, that the questions that arise in implementing
any utilitarian property theory are not easily answered by the courts.
Contemporary empirical accounts of human behavior and shifts in be-
liefs or values are hardly the grist for firm judicial utterances. This
suggests strongly that the form of any "just compensation" for the tak-
33. Compare Professor Bruce Ackerman's "legal" and "social" property, developed in
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION, 116-23 (1977). The book is reviewed thought-
fully in Epstein, The Next Generation of Scholarshop? 30 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1978) and So-
per, On the Relevance o/Philosophy to Law.- Reflections on Ackerman's Private Property and
the Constitution, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 44 (1979). Social property, to Ackerman, is that type of
property any well-socialized person would recognize as his (e.g., surface rights in a plot of
land). Legal property requires the opinion of a legal specialist and embraces abstract claims
of value in things that cannot be reduced to possession. Legal property, says Professor Ack-
erman, may be restricted without compensation more readily than social property. This
typology hardly accounts for many of the uncompensated losses inflicted on "well-social-
ized" persons under takings law. Ackerman's contribution of immediate interest is in recog-
nizing that different criteria of protection may turn on the functions served by various
properties. Arguments presented here follow a similar path by suggesting that some types of
human property are unsuitable for taking, whereas uncompensated use restrictions may en-
croach heavily upon human wealth built upon natural resource appropriation.
1982]
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ing of "utilitarian" or "social" property will be chiefly a question of
legislative judgment. It can be predicted that legislatures will be given
wide latitude to define this type of property, and to define further the
conditions, including compensation, for its reallocation.
This "utilitarian" property is heavily represented in contemporary
wealth holdings in the United States. Many of the assets of capital-
intensive resource management enterprises are of this type. By con-
trast, Lockean fruits-of-the-labor claims are asserted more suitably by
the labor-intensive small entrepreneur. Large enterprises whose wealth
holdings depend upon maintenance of the shifting sands of empirical
support underlying utilitarian property also are well situated to protect'
themselves. Their voices are likely to be heard, and heeded, in the leg-
islative process upon which their continued wealth positions so heavily
depend.
34
C Common Property Theory-. A Source of Provisional Wealth
Our understanding of property rights in natural resources can be
assisted further by exploring the line dividing personal from communal
property. The notion that natural resources are held in common by the
community has philosophical, historical, and empirical foundations.
The idea of common property rights can be traced to the starting points
of civilization hypothesized by philosophers-the state of nature or an
original contract. Under such hypothetical conditions nature's store is
needed by all and open to all. Thus to Seneca nature was a "communal
treasure, '35 to Aquinas a "common possession, ' 36 to Grotius a "com-
mon inheritance, '37 and to Locke a gift from God to Adam and his
posterity "in common."'38
Moreover, early humans, left to their devices unaided by technol-
ogy, perceived wide ranges of compatible uses. 39 These communal
treasures of air, water, sun and soil offered only limited room for con-
flict, and temporary occupancy or use of the commons would not defeat
latecomers. A corollary of this powerful concept of resources in com-
mon was that humans did not strive to hold or to claim that which was
out of reach; everyone had what no one could secure.4° There were no
34. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
35. R. SCHLATFER, supra note 20, at 25 (quoting SENECA, LETTERS, No. 90 (E. Barker
trans. 1932)).
36. Id. at 49-50 (quoting T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-Il, Q. 94, Art. 5).
37. Id. at 127 (citing H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. ii (F. Kelsey trans.
1925)).
38. Locke, supra note 21, at § 24.
39. See M. SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS (1972).
40. See I. FISHER, supra note 28, at 3 ("Rain, wind, clouds, the Gulf Stream, the heav-
enly bodies-especially the sun, from which we derive most of our light, heat, and energy-
are all useful, but are not appropriated, and so are not wealth as commonly understood").
[Vol. 10:205
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conflicts over claims to mine the stars, take the blue out of the sky, or
lock away the icecaps.
This captivating and idealistic notion of natural resources "in
common" fit comfortably with optimistic views of the relationships of
humans with one another, with posterity, and with nature. The out-
pouring of wealth was ongoing, perpetual, seemingly limitless, and by
definition available to future generations. It is hardly surprising that
philosophical thought has dwelt upon this relationship between
humans and nature. What is ours is ours and what is nature's is ours
"in common."
In the context of the takings issue, this perception of a natural re-
source commons reinforces the social nature of value expectations in
this property. The commons, according to the Lockean proviso, is an
ongoing resource bank open to the claims of others in this and future
generations. Because the commons is open to all, needs claims are easy
enough to justify even if they cannot be satisfied. Lockean fruits-of-
the-labor claims run into difficulties because the resource itself and
much of its practical value remain a gift of nature rather than a product
of individual effort. Claims based upon a chain of paper, but lacking
even a Lockean sweat-of-the-brow justification, are especially hollow.
There is something unconvincing about property claims to the moon,
even those tracing title back to a legally constituted king. Natural re-
source commons, from this point of view, are strongly resistant to ex-
clusionary claims; this is provisional wealth open to all claimants.
Two powerful empirical considerations undergird the social nature
of natural resource property. The first is the recognition that much re-
source use, obviously including all consumption of nonrenewables, 41 is
strictly a zero-sum affair; B loses what A gains. This is not a world
where individual wealth desires can be fully protected. Any allocation
decision is simultaneously a decision to inflict a loss. To borrow from
the language of takings law, it can be safely predicted that a necessarily
large number of losers will not be protected by the cover of "just com-
pensation." Their disappointments will be uncompensated.
Second, it so happens that often the world is not only an ugly zero-
sum affair; it is worse than that. Open resource competition not only
divides the pie but often shrinks it in the process. This is the "tragedy
Common property notions are clearly evident among hunter-gatherer peoples. See, e.g, M.
DALY & M. WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTION, AND BEHAVIOR: ADAPTATIONS FOR REPRODUCTION
324-25 (1978).
41. See Daly, Enough is Enough-The Economic Concept of Sufficiency, in LIFE AFTER
'80: ENVIRONMENTAL CHOICES WE CAN LIVE WITH 159 (K. Courrier ed. 1980) (arguing
that it is crucial to protect the renewable resources of forests, fisheries, grasslands, and
croplands, and that overexploitation of nonrenewables leads to overexploitation of renew-
ables). Additional remorse should attend the destruction of renewables as they are con-
signed by human choice to the zero-sum category of nonrenewables.
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of the commons" where the pursuit of individual self-interest works to
the detriment of all.42 This empirical reality justifies a sharp social con-
straint around accumulations of natural resource wealth. Some expec-
tations may be aroused, others dashed to combat the loss; but
individual entitlements may be defined and redefined to protect the
overall productivity of the social commons.
D. Process Theories.: Sources of Fair Treatment
The fourth and final theoretical component of this taking theory is
the assumption that losers singled out by society at least should be
given a chance to contest and argue about their loss of status or mate-
rial standing. In support of such a view, most legal theorists today re-
flexively would invoke Anglo-American concepts of due process, and
with good reason.43 The roots run even deeper, however. Human
hunter-gatherer traditions, enduring for perhaps 99.9 percent of our
species' history, are characterized by small group interactions, par-
ticipatory decisionmaking, and meaningful opportunities to be heard.44
Here is a natural law of procedural due process with remote and august
origins.
Anthropological theory also recognizes that the study of relation-
ships between individuals and the group requires close attention to how
decisions are made. Some expectation of fair dealing between the
group and its members inevitably appears in human cultural patterns,
often in the definitions of property. 45 Admitting that any society with
property ideas must have ways of dealing with individual and group
conflict, however, does not take us far along the road toward adjudging
what process is "due." Some of the most outrageous impositions of
human cruelty, destruction, and harm have been accompanied by pro-
cess arrangements making some sort of bizarre sense. 46 Much philo-
sophical thinking has been devoted to prescribing the ingredients of
fair process,4 7 and many of our great ideas such as equal treatment and
reciprocity of obligation flow from this tradition. One prominent view
is that the legal profession never will be able to say much about justice
42. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Schelling, On
the Ecology of Micromotives, 25 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 59 (1971).
43. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 34.
44. See L. TIGER & R. Fox, THE IMPERIAL ANIMAL chs. 7-9 (1971).
45. See E. HATCH, THEORIES OF MAN AND CULTURE 107-10 (1973); J.H. STEWARD,
THEORY OF CULTURE CHANGE: THE METHODOLOGY OF MULTILINEAR EVOLUTION 103-08
(1963).
46. N. CALDER, HUMAN SACRIFICE (1981). Perhaps the appeal of hunter-gatherer due
process ethics, supra note 44, stems from the fact that we always will be guessing (and thus
may be guilty of wishful thinking) about how our prehistorical ancestors went about decid-
ing individual and group property questions.
47. See, e.g., J. LUCAS, ON JUSTICE (1980); see Mashaw, Administrative Due Process.-
The Quest For A Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981).
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beyond purely process contributions.48
Applied to taking theory, the extensive tradition of process rights
offers little guidance in distinguishing compensable from noncompen-
sable governmental actions. It does suggest, however, that "just com-
pensation" in a constitutional sense assures not a particular amount of
wealth but rather a tradition of fair treatment. Some victims may be
justly compensated under this view not by getting paid but by being
heard, by being treated like others similarly situated, and by being as-
sured that the loss was kept to a minimum.
Furthermore, allocation of process fairness, unlike scarce natural
resources, presents no zero-sum choice between A and B. 49 Due pro-
cess, unlike fossil fuel, is easily created; extending some of it to A does
not necessarily diminish the supply available to B. What this means for
taking theory, perhaps, is that we can expect process fairness to be
spread more widely than the income maintenance so often perceived to
be at the core of the takings doctrine.
E. Summary
Part I of this Article has described four prominent themes of con-
temporary property theory-biological and social functionary justifica-
tions, and the ideas of a resource commons and process fairness.
Acceptance of this description does not necessarily entail acceptance of
the normative and empirical argument advanced in support of these
four themes. All the Article has attempted thus far is to search the
universe of property theory and identify four beacons discernible there.
These themes are the foundation of the taking theory offered here, and
they can be found in the case law of resource allocation to which we
now turn. Thus far this Article has built a theoretical structure by intu-
ition, and constructed a rough prototype. It is time now to cast the net,
tighten the mesh, and improve its design and operation.
50
For the moment, we will proceed on the assumption that the four
themes can be tested by the legal experience of natural resource prop-
erty rights. While the point is debatable, 51 the notion is simply that the
pronouncements of the courts and legislatures will embrace and reflect
faithfully patterns of argumentation that have long persisted. Where
48. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 34.
49. See Rodgers, Building Theories of Judicial Review in Natural Resources Law, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 213, 227 (1981).
50. See K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 59 (1959): "Theories are
nets cast to catch what we call 'the world': to rationalize, to explain, and to master it. We
endeavor to make the mesh ever finer and finer."
51. The transformation of academic or philosophical argument into legal doctrine
takes place only upon satisfaction of a variety of preconditions that may not exist in the legal
process. For example, a particular view may not be urged by litigants, or, if urged, may not
be accepted.
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no single philosophy triumphs, discord is to be expected also in the
rulings of public institutions, especially among those purporting to fol-
low various versions of the popular will. On the basis of this assump-
tion, the theory can be validated and further explained by the case law
of resource allocation; it also can be invalidated by examples rejecting
the themes urged here. 52
II
RESOURCE CONFLICTS IN SPACE AND TIME
This Part examines resource disputes, and the concepts of taking
underlying them, in three contexts: (1) the horizontal and vertical nui-
sances, posed classically by conflicts between adjoining landowners and
by simple surface/subsurface disputes; and "universal nuisances,"
which typically involve more complex resource disputes such as those
between surface owners and airspace users;53 (2) classical takings cases
where the property holder and the state are quarreling over resources;
54
and (3) conflicts over time involving the same resource, illustrated by
the common law of waste, and the federal reserved rights and public
trust doctrines. 55
A. The Messages of Nuisance Law
Nuisance law confirms the idea that human property is protected
by right and utilitarian or social property is vulnerable to uncompen-
sated redefinition. Nuisance cases also demonstrate a strong process
theme aimed at assuring that the social sacrifice be kept to a minimum.
1. The Absolutist Component (Human. Property)
An absolutist sanctuary in nuisance law is unmistakable, and to
52. See supra note 6. Much legal theory is formulated in terms that effectively defy
invalidation. See, for example, Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 864 (1981) ("If a rule of tort law cannot be explained on efficiency
grounds, this is not a contradiction or even a puzzle; it is consistent with the proposition that
most, rather than all, tort doctrines are efficient"). Under Posner's view any tort case es-
chewing efficiency in favor of, say, justice, does not invalidate his theory at all. See Rabin,
The Historical Development ofthe Fault Princple. A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 905,
942, 955 (1981). To invalidate such a theory, it is apparently necessary to search the entire
universe of tort doctrine, and demonstrate that "most" of the time (i.e., in more than 50
percent of the samples) the results contradict the efficiency hypothesis. See Landes & Pos-
ner, supra, at 864.
The descriptive taking theory of this paper can be invalidated by examples rejecting the
pattern of argumentation here developed. I am free to argue, of course, that the courts are
wrong to resist the considerations advanced, let us say, in support of biological property
theory. But then all turns upon the persuasiveness of the argument, and no "scientific"
claim is made that courts actually hew to the detected patterns.
53. See infra sections II.A. 1 & 2.
54. See infra section II.A.3.
55. See infra sections II.B.I-3.
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this observer at least is one of the most prominent features of the doc-
trine. 56 Core interests are protected in nuisance cases, commonly by
the grant of injunctive relief, which represents a refusal to substitute
compensation for the elimination of the encroachment.5 7 Whenever a
court decides that a plaintiff has been pushed too far, it repels the inva-
sion. The focus is rights-oriented and oblivious to claims that the of-
fender must give up more than the value of that preserved. The object
of this rights orientation is not community betterment but individual
security and freedom. For most nuisance plaintiffs, who can safely be
viewed as spillover recipients, the core interests protected in the face of
utilitarian objections include health, abode, and other essentials of liv-
ing reminiscent of the biological property components discussed ear-
lier.58 This respect for central interests of "human" property might
account also for the hands-off approach in the social nuisance cases,59
which accord wide tolerance to half-way houses, hospitals, and other
human undertakings attacked as nuisances.
Nuisance case law discloses a distinct preference for technological
or operational solutions short of ouster of one of the principals.60 This
search for conflict avoidance postpones the issue of limits of available
resources. Insistence upon the best operational practices extends the
space available for use. This is an illustration of the tendency, wide-
spread in natural resources law, to seek avoidance of zero-sum
outcomes. 6'
Nuisance law thus yields a working illustration of friction minimi-
zation-the use of best efforts to avoid interference with other parties.
62
56. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW §§ 2.1-10 (1977); Ellick-
son, Alternatives to Zoning.- Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 719-22,748-60 (1973); Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its
Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 65-73 (1979); Rabin, Nuisance Law. Rethinking
FundamentalAssumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299 (1977).
57. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.11 (1977); Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes
The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
58. See Coquillette, Mosses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Prop-
erty Cases and the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 770-82 (1979) (stressing tendency
in early nuisance cases to protect against interferences with residential living). This nui-
sance law could be said to provide "empirical evidence for a positive 'rights theory' of law."
Posner, supra note 1, at 109 n.32. Additional empirical evidence for a rights theory can be
found in the doctrines of waste, reserved rights, and public trust discussed below. On indi-
vidual veto aspects of rights analyses, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1967); R. DWOR-
KIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 1-13 (1977).
59. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.4, 116; Epstein, supra note 56, at 90-94.
60. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.6. On the utilitarian nature of these decisions,
see Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. REV. 991, 1012-26 (1977).
61. Legislators customarily embrace growth models because they want to please every-
body and avoid the testiness and political costs associated with reallocation decisions in a
no-growth world.
62. See Blumm, Hydropower v. Salmon. The Struggle ofthe Paciflc Northwest's Anadro-
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The best practices are socially defined but are constrained by the re-
sources of the actors. The policy is one of peaceful coexistence, and the
courts work hard to achieve this reconciliation. Potential losers are
promised a close look to assure that the loss be kept to a minimum, and
that best efforts be taken to avoid it.
A rule of friction minimization is a rough approximation of what
might be expected from judges whose view of human nature conforms
to the teachings of sociobiology. After their basic needs are satisfied,
individuals in human society long have been expected to sacrifice for
the benefit of neighbors. Human altruistic behavior 63 extends to a vari-
ety of activities (sharing food and knowledge, helping in times of dan-
ger), and it is thought to have evolved because of the wide range of
human reciprocal relations. 64 Crudely put, an individual is kind and
generous to others because it is useful to have them return the kindness
and generosity. Biological theory supports a rule of best efforts to pre-
vent resource usage from working to the disadvantage of another mem-
ber of the society.65 Thus, in protecting human property and in
enforcing reciprocity, nuisance law confirms the themes of biological
property theory adverted to earlier.6
6
mous Fish Resourcesfor a Peaceful Coexistence with the Federal Columbia River Power Sys-
tem, 11 ENV. L. 211, 295-300 (1981); Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered. The Role of
Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1980). Compare the interesting
analysis in Fredrickson & Stephanopolis, Microbial Competition, 213 SCIENCE 972 (1981)
(taking up the question of whether "complete competitors" can coexist).
63. Altruism is defined by biologists as an act benefitting another individual to the
physical detriment of the donor who expects no repayment. Eg., Hamilton, The Genetic
Evolution of Social Behavior 1, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 1, 14-16 (1964). A limited "self-
ish gene" version of altruism is challenged in M. SAHLINS, USE AND ABUSE OF BIOLOGY:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF SOCIOBIOLOGY (1976).
64. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 W. REV. BIOLOGY 35, 45-53
(1971). Biologists usually distinguish nepotism (sharing with relatives) from reciprocity
among unrelated individuals. See R. ALEXANDER, DARWINISM AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 25,
256 (1979); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).
65. See Rodgers, supra note 62, at 18-23. More formally, the biological rule is viewed
as one that maximizes inclusive fitness or genetic representation in future generations. See
Preface, EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: AN ANTHROPOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE (M. Chagnon & W. Irons eds. 1979). The rationales of reciprocity and
preference for kin are developed within this framework. R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE
(1976); Hamilton, supra note 63; Trivers, supra note 64. Cf. G. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION
AND NATURAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT 26
(1966). It is sufficient for our purposes to acknowledge that biological theory recognizes that
individuals do what is best for themselves, and this often includes being very generous.
Compare Locke's remonstrances against wasting resources, supra note 22.
66. See supra Section I.A. This paper assumes that courts will adopt property justifica-
tions strongly held by the population. There are other reasons why judges in nuisance cases
might embrace allocation rules tending to approximate biological sharing theory. One is
that a search for a community standard of good behavior might lead intuitively to the rule
commonly governing sharing among people with high reciprocal interactions. Nuisance
law, after all, has roots long preceding the industrial revolution, and thus its perceptions of
how neighbors should behave predictably might borrow from kinship and friendship shar-
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2. The Utilitarian Component (Social Property)
A biological rights theory does not explain nuisance law com-
pletely. A doctrine that claims as a principal feature the "balancing" of
interests is not bereft of utilitarian considerations.67 Apart from the
uncompromising protection of core property, the cases manifest a con-
sistent aim to get the most out of conflicting uses. More is better so
long as the basics are protected. The "balancing" that takes place thus
often includes not only consideration of interparty interests (who was
there first, the comparative ease of adjustment) but also social interests
(the character of the neighborhood, the welfare of employees on de-
fendant's payroll).
Nuisance law, in its classical form, can be viewed as a reallocation
of wealth in a world of limited resources. One party appropriates re-
sources, a loser protests, the court intervenes to enforce restoration.
The remedy, it should be emphasized, can be highly disruptive of the
status quo. The original appropriator, after all, has been obliged to
relinquish (1) something of value--call it a property right, (2) that the
appropriator has put to actual use, (3) often with longstanding acquies-
cence or approval of the state, and the loss is (4) uniquely felt by a
single party, and (5) brings disappointment and frustration of invest-
ment-backed expectations, perhaps (6) to the full extent of the antici-
pated value.68 The response to these weighty objections is that justice
to the loser requires that we repudiate investments that intrude upon
another's property rights. An appropriator suffers, but the property
was something in which the appropriator's "ownership" was temporary
and fleeting, and subject to others' interests.
A sizeable component of nuisance law thus deals with social prop-
erty subject to uncompensated reallocation. 69 Close scrutiny reveals
that this reallocation is justified by two arguments suggestive of theo-
ing rules developed within closely knit groups. Judges, who are teachers of sorts, also might
be inclined to adopt a rule of qualified altruism, such as minimizing friction, which comes
close to the behavioral advice given by parents to children. See R.D. Alexander, Darwinism
and Human Affairs 262-66, 273-76 (1979). Judges as historians and judges as teachers thus
might come around to similar views of human nature and fair dealing.
An exogenous explanation is that courts might be led unknowingly to biological sharing
rules because departures from the biological optimum would be challenged repeatedly by
those suffering the deprivation. Compare Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection
of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 65 (1977).
67. See W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at §§ 2.1-2.3; see supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
68. These factors constitute a reasonably complete list of criteria invoked by the courts
in support of the conclusion that a taking has occurred. See Soper, The Constitutional
Framework of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW 20, 57-71 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
69. This is so despite the fact that nuisance law can be safely viewed as predominantly
a corrective justice doctrine. See Epstein, supra note 56.
1982]
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERL Y
retical property themes discussed earlier. The first is that some kinds of
property are held in common, immune from claims of permanent enti-
tlement.70 Nature made it, goes the argument, and this is provisional
wealth open to reallocation as competing needs emerge. The second is
that the Lockean legacy, honoring the right to produce and to work,
creates a reciprocal network under which the right to human property
appropriations must be honored in others. 7' Group living necessitates
accommodation to others' needs. At their roots, both of these justifica-
tions stem from ideas of contributive justice. This Article will explore
these ideas in further detail by considering types of losses that can be
considered just.
a. Socialproperty and the just loss
At least two types of just loss are widely recognized in the law.72
The first is occasioned by presumed misconduct of the loser, where sur-
render of the gains is thought to be appropriate. This is an expression
of corrective justice and it appears in the "noxious" use and nuisance
theories of taking.73 Under this view government enforcement of
divestitures is not a taking, however disappointing it may be, but rather
reinstatement of the original understanding.
This theory, premised upon personal fault in overreaching a so-
cially prescribed norm, can be reformulated quite easily into a theory
of contributive justice dependent not at all upon showings of culpabil-
ity. As Professor Michelman explains, in some cases "society reserves
the right to preempt the exploitation of a certain narrowy described
class of resources at any time, and. . . no one is to form any inconsis-
tent expectations about the future use and control of those resources." 74
But expectations can be dashed quickly by society; when this is done
the result is hardly perceived as an instance of slapping down the
wrongdoer who did not get the word. In Pennsylvania, to mention one
example, a broad spectrum of resources is now "subject to" the public's
reassertion of interest in them. For a number of years, that state's con-
stitution has provided that
the people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property of all
70. See Coquillette, supra note 58, at 799-820 (discussing res communes doctrine).
71. See Epstein, supra note 56, at 82-87 (discussing the "live and let live" rule in nui-
sance cases). Nuisance law has a strong corrective justice theme. That which is restored,
however, is presumed to belong to the winning party under some version of fair sharing.
72. A third possibility might be losses attending natural mishaps. How many tort
plaintiffs are told they must depart emptyhanded because the injury was occasioned by an
Act of God? This outcome might be described as random justice.
73. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1236-41; Soper, supra note 68, at 52-55.
74. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1240 (emphasis added).
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the people, including generations yet to come. 75
Appropriators, dipping too deeply into this resource bank, might be
said to have been forewarned that they may be obliged to disgorge val-
ues without compensation. A more credible justification for compel-
ling the relinquishment of this wealth is that, regardless of expectations,
society reserves the right to redefine property in natural resources per-
ceived as being held in common. By this route, a nuisance theory of
corrective justice can be recast as a public trust theory of contributive
justice.
The main issue is not the differences one may have with Professor
Michelman over the range of values preempted by a commitment to
"the commons" and expectations associated with it.76 The key is in the
structure of this anti-nuisance or public trust theory of taking law. This
idea recognizes a condition qualifying the use of the natural resources
that make up social wealth; these "common" assets are subject to di-
vestiture by reallocation or taxation. Private legal interests in the re-
source commons are real enough, and are given meaningful process
protections, 77 but considerable latitude is afforded legislatures to reas-
sign natural resource wealth in light of shifting assumptions and values.
A second type of just loss occurs as a price of honoring protected
behavior by others. The idea is that a Lockean fruits-of-the-labor
property rationale presupposes adequate opportunities for the other
person. Consequently, the early appropriators are limited, and their
wealth curtailed, to keep the door open for later appropriators. This is
a type of forced contribution we could call contributive justice.78 The
75. Pa. Const. art. I, § 27.
76. Professor Michelman would find an illegitimate expectation where "investments
(a) interrupted some else's enjoyment of an economic good, . . . or (b) were of a sort
which society had adequately made known should not become the object of expectations of
continuing enjoyment." Michelman, supra note 14, at 1239-41. One might ask why the
expressions of the Pennsylvania environmental bill of rights have not been an operative
assumption since our hunter/gatherer predecessors acknowledged resources in common, or
at least since Locke announced his famous proviso. Lewis H. Lapham, editor of Harper's,
has expressed the view that natural resources belong to the people in common, rather than to
individuals or nations:
Oil differs from grain or corn in that crops must be planted and harvested, and
thus they reflect the labor of men. But what labor resulted in the seas of oil or the
fields of the ocean? By what right can any nation claim to own the residue of the
evolutionary past? Just as money is the fossil record of creative labor, so oil is the
fossil record of the death of billions upon billions of organisms, all of them the
common ancestors of man.
Who owns the Atlantic or the Mediterranean? Who owns the biosphere or the
outer reaches of space? ....
Why should not all commodities essential to human life be held in common?
Perhaps this is a futile and idealistic question, but it is one that not enough people
ask. The failure to discuss the question in the voices of reason shifts the argument
into the bombast of war.
Lapham, On Risk, Ignorance, and Oil, HARPERS' 8, 10 (June 1980).
77. See infra Section B.2.b.
78. See J. LUCAS, supra note 47, at 231-54. Horace Greeley's advice to "go West"
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most prominent examples are found in tort law, where victims are
obliged to bear all sorts of losses occasioned by another's uncalculating
behavior.79 The beneficiaries of a wide variety of government supports
and subsidies could be made poorer overnight by shifts in policy, pre-
sumably without offending preconceived notions of a "vested right."80
Grants to one group do not foreclose the reallocation pleas of other
groups; nuclear power, for example, is every bit as vulnerable to a re-
peal of the Price-Anderson Act8 as it is to a series of crucial permit
denials, but neither of these catastrophic losses would raise colorable
taking claims. Nor, indeed, would there be any taking problems if the
federal government damaged nuclear or fossil-based power assets indi-
rectly by sudden and drastic shifts in support of conservation and solar
alternatives.
This discussion of just losses is intended to underscore the "social"
component of a natural resources property theory. Corrective and con-
tributive rationales justify widespread reallocations, and we would ex-
pect them to reappear in the sources to which we turn to fill out the
theory. With these preliminaries out of the way, it is time to look more
closely at the role of the legislature in reallocating social wealth, which
is held subject to revisable expectations.
b. Social property. universal nuisances and the reallocative role of the
legislature
Legislatures often speak on the subject of resource allocation in
nuisance suits and courts take their words seriously.8 2 The interesting
question is whether, in moving the line one way or the other, the
lawmakers run afoul of taking claims when they tip the balance
strongly in favor of one of the parties. 83
For instruction on the scope of legislative freedom to reallocate
social property, we will examine a class of resource conflicts that can be
wasn't extended to everyone: "Give the first chance at the gold region to those who have as
yet had no chance elsewhere." Quoted in D.D. Jackson, Gold Dust 73 (1980).
79. The freedom to take from another through economic competition, for instance, is
sacrosanct in principle and often honored in fact. Indeed, it could be said that there is little
"property" interest in the United States that is not held subject to divestiture by exercise of
the universal right to compete.
80. The principal nonrenewable fuel industries today (uranium, coal, oil, and natural
gas) are supported by a variety of subsidies said to approach in value $100 billion per year.
See R. STOBAUGH & D. YERGIN, ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT
THE HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 294 (1979).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
82. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.10. For a valuable discussion of whether courts
should demand higher performance levels than those legislatively mandated, see
Michelman, Pollution as a Tort.- A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 YALE
L. J. 647 (1971).
83. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553 (1914) (Holmes,
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described as universal nuisances. The concept of universal nuisance is
intended to embrace a variety of resource conflicts with many users and
pervasive effects (air pollution, jet noise, fluorocarbons, ground water,
fishing resources). Universal nuisances differ from the classical hori-
zontal and vertical conflicts in the following particulars: (1) users are
numerous, indeterminate and diffuse; (2) appropriation is incomplete,
with an increment of the natural wealth remaining economically or
technologically out of reach; (3) private property rights in the resource
commons are poorly defined, which often leads to excessive entry and
high environmental costs in mutual spillovers 4 These conflicts illus-
trate the wide scope of the legislature's power to accommodate oppos-
ing interests free from the restrictions of taking law.
Legislative linedrawing in the context of universal nuisances rou-
tinely is sustained against constitutional objections85 under rationales
commonly associated with taking theories. Illustratively, abatement of
air pollution for the protection of human health86 would be justified by
reference to a noxious use or anti-nuisance rationale. 87 That is, "what
you thought was yours is not yours at all; we have now decided to put
an end to your overreaching, a step we always have reserved the right
to take."
Legislative interventions in these contexts also are sustainable be-
cause behavior limitations imposed by pollution laws ordinarily allow
some use, avoiding the often fatal charge that a valuable property inter-
est has been rendered worthless.8 8 The legislative objectives-for ex-
ample, more to go around for this generation, transfers of wealth to
"more productive" hands, ceilings to protect use by the next genera-
tion-are met short of forbidding all usage.
84. See Hardin, supra note 42.
85. At common law, users are acknowledged as having against one another a legal
right to prevent "unreasonable" consumption. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation Dist. 3 Cal. 2d 489, 567-79, 45 P.2d 972, 1007-13 (1935) (water); Eliff
v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 582, 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948) (oil). This formulation
uses the language of nuisance law, and it is understood as inviting judicial linedrawing to
prevent resource waste (in the sense of certain benefits being rendered unavailable to any-
one) or misallocation (in the sense that someone is securing more than an officially sanc-
tioned "fair" share of benefits in the face of conflicting claims by others). These disputes
invite legislative intervention, and the resulting laws in turn lead to revisions in wealth ex-
pectations, often attacked as takings.
86. This standard is established by federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), without hint of taking difficulties, despite widespread efficiency objections. See
Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks.- Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking,
4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 191, 201-04 (1980).
87. See, e.g., H.F.H. Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 521, 542 P.2d 237, 247
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (possible changes in zoning laws are clearly foresee-
able to land speculators and other property purchasers); Michelman, supra note 14, at 1236-
41; Soper, supra note 68, at 52-55.
88. Stoebuck expounds upon this "too far" test in Police Power, Takings, and Due Pro-
cess, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1062-65 (1980).
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Another feature of universal nuisances, suggestive of taking doc-
trine, is that private property claims are fuzzy at the boundaries, wealth
expectations problematical and in fluctuation. Interests to be weighed
are overlapping, abstract, interrelated in uncertain ways, and thus suit-
able for definition by legislative guess.8 9 The point is that where the
private right is in flux or in doubt the user loses something of only
speculative value when the government closes the door upon further
attempts to appropriate.
Illustrative is the ferae naturae theory of wildlife ownership, 90
which has been applied to some fugaceous minerals. 91 This theory
reserves the "property" label exclusively for those resources reduced to
possession. Private rights must be explicitly and narrowly carved out
of nature's commons. After all, the object of the hunt was the catch,
not an investment-backed expectation, and stiff competition had to be
overcome.92 Whatever the origins of theferae naturae rules, it defeats
taking claims against hunting and fishing closures, despite convincing
assertions that existing investments wedded only with opportunity soon
would yield individual wealth.93 Nevertheless, this conventional idea
that wealth in wildlife counts only when the benefits are in one's pocket
sharply conditions expected returns from the resource.
An example of the ample leeway accorded legislative accommoda-
tion under conditions of extreme uncertainty can be found in the Price-
Anderson Act,94 which reallocates the financial risks of nuclear power
plant accidents from utilities to potential victims by establishing a ceil-
ing on prospective tort claims. In this situation the membership of the
winning and losing classes is obscure and overlapping; some potential
accident victims also would be beneficiaries of nuclear power. The
89. See Rodgers, supra note 86, at 216-18. The legislative discretion to define ambigu-
ous property rights presupposes also a discretion to define partial compensation that would
be considered "just." See Hagman, Compensable Regulation, in WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION 256 (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski
eds. 1978); Bozung, Judicially Created Zoning With Compensation.- California's Brief Experi-
ment With Inverse Condemnation, 10 ENVT'L L. 67 (1979); Costonis, Fair Compensation and
the Accommodation Power.- Antidotesfor the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975),
90. See M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977). Chimpan-
zees subscribe to a food sharing rule under which the first appropriator, regardless of status,
is entitled to the find. See D. FREEMAN, HUMAN SOCIOBIOLOGY: A HOLISTIC APPROACH 42
(1979). So, too, with dolphins and wolves. See R. PETERS, MAMMALIAN COMMUNICATION:
A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF MEANING 207, 235 (1980).
9 1. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 2 10 S.W.2d 558 (1948).
92. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 175, N.Y. (1805). To this day, hunting retains
its lottery characteristics despite a decided tilt of the technological balance in favor of the
human hunter.
93. See, e.g., Note, Legal Dimensions o/Entry Fishery Management, 17 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 157, 766-67 (1976) (citing among other authorities Miller v. McLaughlin, 221 U.S.
201 (1930), and Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894)).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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prospect of loss by a named victim, and its extent, are problematical
and uncertain. The Supreme Court has sustained the constitutionality
of the statute, with a bow to legislative authority to tackle uncertainty. 95
Legislatures have freedom not only to resolve uncertainty but also
to express new values. Illustrative is North Dakota's Surface Owner
Protection Act,96 which abolishes the traditional superiority of mineral
rights over surface rights97 by requiring payment to the surface owner
for losses of agricultural production caused by mining activity.98 This
is a case where only two parties are involved and opportunities for pri-
vate. agreements yielding the best combination of uses are relatively
unimpeded.99 Legislative intervention thus cannot be justified by con-
cern for future generations or non-human values, or as an attempt to
resolve uncertainty. The wealth shift is more likely an expression of
the view that strict liability will minimize the friction' ° or that greater
"overall happiness" will attend an income shift from mineral to surface
owners. This is frankly redistributive but it is a reassignment of natural
resource wealth accommodating the survival interests of the prominent
claimants.
The universal nuisance experience confirms a broad legislative dis-
cretion to reallocate natural resource wealth free of constitutional stric-
tures. Legislatures may draw lines where wealth expectations are
unsettled and may guess about what losses temporarily imposed may
expand the pie.' 0 ' They may go further to identify new values, includ-
ing a respect for nature, that may defeat previously settled wealth ex-
pectations. 0 2 They may also, based upon wide-ranging empirical
95. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84-87
(1978) (rejecting substantive due process attack on the Price-Anderson Act).
96. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-18.
97. See Dycus, Legislative Clar~ication ofthe Correlative Rights ofSurface and Mineral
Owners, 33 VAND. L. REv. 871, 872-73 (1980).
98. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18-08. The statute requires, if a surface mining operation
comes within five hundred feet of any farm building, payment of either "the fair market
value of the farm building or the entire cost of removing the farm building to a location
where the mining operation will not come within five hundred feet [152.4 meters] of such
building or buildings." Id., § 38-18-07(2). This conffict would be considered a vertical nui-
sance under my typology.
99. Note, however, that since the legislature made the surface owner's rights "absolute
and unwaivable," id., § 30-18-07(3) it apparently recognized disparities in bargaining power
between surface and mineral owners.
100. See G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 145-73 (1970) (on general deter-
rence); supra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Texas v. Donoghue, 302 U.S. 284 (1937); Patterson v. Stanolind Oil &
Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939).
102. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); cf. Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Delby
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C., 1976) (re-
jecting due process arguments against seizure of spermicetti from sperm whale although the
product was legally imported).
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estimates, reassign wealth upon the understanding that, productivity or
satisfaction gains will offset disappointment costs.' 0 3 Thus, the legisla-
ture is given room to expand, extend, and reallocate natural resource
wealth. It may revise the roster of those with recognized claims (in-
cluding future generations and nonhuman life), define the reach of un-
certain claims, and make judgments about what reassignments will
reduce friction or increase satisfaction or productivity. In doing so it
develops critera distinguishing winners from losers and contributes to
prescribing the process within which allocation judgments are made. 104
Thus far we have reaffirmed a broad legislative discretion to revise
wealth expectations in the resource "commons." We must look else-
where to discover the limits within which this legislative freedom oper-
ates. We will look first at some leading takings theories, then attempt
to fill in the details of a theory that would be faithful both to the tak-
ings case law and to the prominent theoretical themes outlined earlier
in this Article.
c. Social property: prominent takings theories
Professor Joseph Sax, viewing many contemporary takings con-
flicts as contests over a resource commons, would find no taking when-
ever the government intervenes to settle a conflict. 0 5 The key for Sax
is to determine "whether an owner is being prohibited from making a
use of his land that has no conflict-creating spillover effects."'
0 6
The no-spillover test has promise for defining both private wealth
holdings not subject to redefinition by the state and the courts' role in
protecting them. Applying the test, however, Professor Sax character-
izes the classic airport/residence noise problem as a spillover standoff
where "each of the conflicting uses, residence and airport, demands the
imposition of a form of servitude on the other. The airport requires the
adjacent land to serve as a receptacle for noise, and the resident re-
quires the airport to be held as a zone of quiet."'' 0 7 This notion of citi-
zens spilling over into adjacent airspace implies an economic test for
spillovers under which a contestable "commons" arises whenever A's
beneficial use imposes costs on B.108
103. E.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
104. For an indication of the substantial legislative role in developing process rights in
resource reallocation decisions, see Rodgers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee- Environmen-
tal Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 716-18 (1979).
105. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 154 (1971).
106. Id. at 164.
107. Id. at 164-65.
108. Id. at 152 n.9 (citing Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1
(1960)). In days past, first year torts students were told that "everyone can understand a
punch in the nose." C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 21 (2d
ed. 1969). These days, with the discovery of the triviality of causation in an economic sense,
it seems that nobody can understand a punch in the nose: interaction between victim and
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Thus, under the Sax view, the resident spills over into the airspace,
the homeowner spills over onto the smelter, and the farmer spills over
onto the power company."°9 The government, as referee, could hold in
each of these cases for the party who would appear intuitively to be the
offender. Of course, these interactions can be viewed as not at all sym-
metrical in a physical sense. The non-smoker's act of breathing, after
all, has no effect on the smoker, and a physical test reveals without too
much difficulty who is imposing the servitude on whom. I0
Thus the first problem with the spillover test, at least in its eco-
nomic version, is that it is causation-oblivious, making all joint interac-
tions neutral before the governmental reallocator. The reviewing court
is supposed to be indifferent between the shooter of the cannon and the
recipient of the shot. This could lead to divestability, without compen-
sation, of even the core values of health and abode protected by nui-
sance law. By contrast, a causation-sensitive takings test, responsive to
the nonreciprocal nature of the interactions outlined above, would re-
quire that courts define the "human property" rights presumptively
protected against outside assault and legislative reallocation."'I
Professor Sax approves a wide discretion in legislatures to realign
without compensation the wealth expectations of claimants to a re-
source commons. The problem with using any spillover test as the
measure of a property right, however, is that it is entirely utilitarian in
structure, making property revocable upon revision of external senti-
ments or actions. Wealth becomes wealth "in common" depending
upon what others think or do. While the range of defeasible interests is
broad and nicely described by the idea of a resource commons, the
picture is incomplete. All possessions should not be put in jeopardy by
injurer is seen as a mutual problem, and the solution might as well be nose guards as fist
restraints. See Rodgers, supra note 62, at 29-33. On the importance of a coherent test of
causation in tort justice theory, see Horwitz, Law and Economics,- Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 911 (1980).
109. To extend the examples, if I desire my neighbor's truck, are we in the presence of a
conflict over property held "in common," resolvable either way by the legislature?
110. See Epstein, supra note 56, at 60-65.
111. The protections would take the form of rules of construction, process constraints, or
even constitutionally defined minima of human existence. The common law of nuisance is
without constitutional basis but uses a rights analysis to protect a nonutilitarian core. See
supra section II.A.2. On the possibility of a disparity between the "property" protected by
the due process and takings clauses, see Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 1081-83.
It is also plausible to expect that restrictive readings of the "public use" requirement
would be invoked against reallocation proposals with regressive income distribution effects
and to protect human property. See, e.g., Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546 (1914); Handley v. Cook, 252 S.E.2d 147, 152 (W. Va. 1979) (McGraw, J., dissenting)
(recognizing as valid the "no public use" argument on behalf of small landowners whose
property was taken by power company to construct high voltage power line serving a single
coal mining operation). Cf. F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 24 (1979) (It is
important to remember that "even the majority should have unrestricted power only over
the use of those resources which have been dedicated to common use.").
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shifts in opinion. Acknowledgement of a human property core would
protect against an unconstrained power to reallocate.
Against this background, a tripartite conception of property
emerges: (1) core "human" property interests that may be taken only
upon terms of the owner; (2) private property not included in this core,
which may be taken upon payment of compensation; and (3) social
property in the resource commons, which may be redefined to the own-
er's detriment without payment of compensation.
Professor Michelman, contrary to Sax, believes that the principal
problem in takings cases is not overcompensation but undercompensa-
tion. He argues that courts could require compensation if its absence
would be critically demoralizing. 1 2 Professor Michelman recognizes
that the courts are not well suited to determine demoralization costs
occasioned when other property owners hesitate to pursue future in-
vestments in recognition of a legislative power to alter expectations.
113
Any community standard, especially a measure of group psychology, is
subtle and elusive, and varies with time; if the disappointment is
sharply perceived and losers especially vehement, compensation under
such a standard is arguable. Thus it is that an appealing judicial case
could be built for former slaveowners, discouraged by the downturn in
their expectations,' 1 4 or brewers who suffer setbacks as a result of a
temporary surge in public opinion favoring prohibition." 5 Looking
ahead, consider the widespread demoralization costs that would attend
a national repudiation of nuclear power, placed in a new light by Three
Mile Island, or, say, a prohibition on the sale or purchase of coal occa-
sioned by insights into the consequences of warming the earth by exces-
112. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1214. Some, of course, would be indifferent to the
redistribution taking place and still others would gain a positive satisfaction from the deci-
sion not to pay; there would be a saving, after all, of tax dollars, and some would consider it
a social tonic of sorts to withhold payment, say, to a pesticide manufacturer suffering losses
from a public decision banning a product. These are details, however, and we can assume
that satisfaction gains can be set off against the dissatisfaction losses. The important point is
that a community standard, which might be called a reasonableness test, is invoked to tell us
when a legislative body must pay for the right to legislate.
113. Professor Michelman is quite sensitive to the institutional difficulties of courts ap-
plying the standards he develops, see id. at 1245-1257, but he is also prepared to invoke his
utilitarian test to explain a good deal of the case law on just compensation, see id. at 1224-45.
The test, in any event, is suitable, if not recommended, for judicial application. Cf Soper,
supra note 33, at n.9. ("This peculiar view of the judge-in essence transforming him into a
super-legislator who can never settle for less than best-results from ignoring the fact that a
judge starts with a mandate to protect property, not a roving commission to maximize utility
wherever he can").
114. Jeremy Bentham would have paid compensation to this group. See Long, Bentham
on Property, in THEORIES OF PROPERTY: ARISTOTLE TO THE PRESENT 221, 243 (Calgary
Institute of Humanities 1979). An argument to the contrary is that payment is not required
for the reallocation of wealth built upon appropriation of another's physical and genetic
resources.
115. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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sive releases of carbon dioxide.' 16 Such legislative steps, which would
revise wealth expectations enormously, surely are not susceptible to ju-
dicial recalculation.
Wholly apart from whether expectations stand still long enough,
or come out of hiding often enough, for the courts confidently to iden-
tify them, is the question of whether the issue of compensation ought to
turn on whether the community is sufficiently incensed to call for a
payoff. We should not ignore the possibility that utilitarianism, con-
ceived to advance compensation, can be turned against it. The poten-
tial underinclusiveness of inquiries into demoralization costs would be
tested by attacks on the property of minorities' whose causes are un-
likely to enlist sympathy because their experiences are not universal.
Thus the forced relocation of Japanese-Americans during World War
II might entail an excusable loss because the peculiar burdens are
quickly forgotten by a society at war.1 17 Indian fishing rights, to men-
tion another example, have been taken in every practical sense of the
word by state actions for the better part of this century with limited
external remorse, 1 8 perhaps because onlookers have in jeopardy very
little wealth of their own remotely resembling a treaty right to take fish.
No doubt utilitarian arguments can be devised that would authorize
payment to native and Japanese-Americans, but the theory of utilitari-
anism and its applications contain no kernel of nonnegotiable protec-
tion immune from utilitarian override. By contrast, the law of nuisance
exhibits a strong rights component that invites a confident judicial in-
quiry into whether the individual has been pushed too far." 19 Courts
can undertake this inquiry without probing the flabby structure of com-
munity expectations.
There is reason to expect, moreover, that expectations grossly ex-
ceed any plausible prospects of fulfilling them. Evidence is accumulat-
ing that people measure success in relative terms. The question is not
how well they are doing, but rather how well they are doing in relation
to others. 120 The sum of individual expectations far surpasses the
available stock of status and resources, especially as we now approach
116. On the problem of climate modification, see NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY AND CLIMATE (1977); H. BERNARD, JR., THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECT (1980).
117. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The prospects for minorities
are decidedly more bleak if utilitarian calculators can hold down "the demoralization costs
of a failure to compensate either by preventing the matter from becoming widely known or
by not revealing the general implications of the particular decision," Michelman, supra note
14, at 1224. Torture, it might be said, is often attended by secrecy.
118. Some of the details appear in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
119. See supra section II.A.I.; R. DWORKIN, supra note 58, at 1-13.
120. R. ALEXANDER, supra note 64, at 239-40.
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a zero-sum world where gains to one person are losses to another.' 21
The better question is not whether expectations are disappointed but
whether the setback imposed renders a party unable to compete. 122
Thus the Sax and Michelman views confirm what the universal
nuisance cases make clear-that legislatures have considerable room to
reallocate resource wealth. But they do not account fully for two cru-
cial components of the taking theory we are exploring-the absolutist
individual property entitlement and the reach of social or provisional
property reallocable without compensation. Nor do these respective
takings tests give us firm guidance in defining that middle ground of
private property which is important enough to justify compensation but
insufficiently indispensable to allow the holder a veto. It is to this clas-
sification job that we now turn. Our raw material is drawn from the
takings cases.
3. Combining Absolutism With Utilitarianism: The Takings Doctrines
a. Protecting the core
Of the prominently recognized classifications of takings law,' 2 3 the
judicial favorite is the "too far" formulation whose modern origins go
back to Justice Holmes' famous dictum in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. 2 4 "While property may be regulated to a certain extent," ac-
cording to Holmes, "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking."I 25 This theory ties compensability to the extent of loss suffered
by the rights holder. Significant recent scholarship 126 interprets this in-
quiry into whether the loser has been pushed beyond the limits of the
call of duty as a question more of legislative power than of compensa-
tion. So viewed, the "too far" test resembles a substantive due process
inquiry, asking whether the legislature should be doing this sort of
thing to people, not whether it should pay for the vandalism.'2 7
This diminution of value test for a taking can be reconciled with a
view of human nature compatible with biological theory. Courts at-
tempt, as in nuisance cases, to ascertain that core of property necessary
to carry out a trade or make a living. This is a search for a survival
minimum, or conversely, the limits of social incursion. Biological the-
121. See L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY (1980); HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO
GROWTH (1976).
122. See the discussion of the "too far" or diminution of value test, infra Section II.A.3.
123. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
124. 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see McGinley & Barrett, Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon
Revisited- Is the Federal Surface Mining Act a Valid Exercise of the Police Power or an Un-
constitutional Taking? 16 U. TULSA L.J. 418 (1981).
125. 260 U.S. at 415.
126. See Oakes, Property Rights in ConstitutionalAnalysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583
(1981); Stoebuck, supra note 88.
127. See Henkin, Privacy andAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-25 (1974).
[Vol. 10:205
TAKINGS THEORY
ory predicts, after all, that a society based upon high reciprocity and
altruism would be monitored closely by the participants to make sure
that benefits and costs are fairly distributed. 128 What counts is whether
the sacrifice is too drastic, either in comparison to others or absolutely
in the sense of whether the victim can take the blow and continue to
function. This analysis suggests a substantive due process or equal pro-
tection constitutional inquiry, 129 which underscores the distinction be-
tween whether the legislature can do this sort of thing and whether it
should pay for what it can do.130
b. Compensatingfor the loss ofprivate property
Even if the "too far" test can be understood as a form of constitu-
tional protection for what this Article calls human property, a compre-
hensive taking theory should attempt a plausible account of ordinary
private property for which compensation is required. Obviously, gov-
ernments "take" and pay for a good deal of property that is neither an
untouchable core nor a freely revocable commons. Compensation by
the payment of money represents protection of what has been called a
liability right.131 It might be helpful to look at the problem through a
tort lens, reformulating the issue of takings compensation as a question
of whether government action toward the losers can be viewed as tor-
tious and therefore compensable. This question in turn opens up in-
quiries into what governments do, and should do, and when they
should pay for the losses they impose.
The fourfold account of property theory in Part I has little to say
about what governments do, but a clear perception of the role of the
state is discernible there. The biological and social functionary prop-
erty theories are expressed in terms of what is best for the citizens as
individuals. The principal reasons we have property are to protect
their biological needs and fulfill their social needs. Even the natural
resource "common" property is something the citizens, not necessarily
128. See Irons, Natural Selection, Adaptation, and Human Social Behavior, in EVOLU-
TIONARY BIOLOGY AND HUMAN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
4, 26 (N. Chagnon & W. Irons eds. 1979) ("One would further expect that the willingness of
each individual to incur further costs for the benefit of the other would depend on each
participant's evaluation of the history of exchanges").
129. See infra Section II.B.2.b; Stoebuck, supra note 88.
130. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring). Empirical evidence raises the suspicion that Congress and the courts
often understand that a judgment that compensation is required will defeat regulation as a
practical matter. A good example is the compensation requirement of the federal Highway
Beautification Act of 1965, 33 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 which, coupled with a preemptive
purpose and low appropriations, hampered the states from moving against aesthetically of-
fensive billboards and junkyards under the police power. See Lamm & Yasinow, The High-
way Beautiication Act of 1956- A Case Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENVER L.J. 437
(1969).
131. See Calabresi & Melamud, supra note 26.
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the state, jointly own. The government in this picture has some distrib-
utive, policing, and process functions. Nevertheless, the sum total of
social wealth is owned by the citizens, not their states. This "minimal
state" view is in accord with the popular contract justice theories of the
origins of the state, which hold that prescribed government powers are
the product of citizen cession. The same sort of limited state is an em-
pirical reality in hunter-gatherer societies, which have little use for im-
perial trappings and ostentatious official wealth.132
A state expected to dispense fair process and reallocate occasion-
ally might be thought to be stepping out of character when it under-
takes to accumulate wealth. In takings law, a direct government
takeover long has been a key indicium of compensation. 33 Scholars
have built taking theories around the distinction between government
undertakings that regulate and those that enhance the official resource
base. Professor Sax has advocated a distinction between the govern-
ment as referee, not obliged to pay losers, and the government as entre-
preneur, which must pay for losses from which it benefits. 34 Professor
Stoebuck invokes historical arguments in support of a similar view that
"just compensation" is constitutionally required only when the govern-
ment functionally transfers property to itself, and not when it rear-
ranges private rights under the police power.' 35
One key is whether the government physically takes over the prop-
erty, either to hold for its own account or to redistribute elsewhere. It is
the use of the medium of a government enterprise that is important.
The government that must take hold in order to reallocate is prone to
the same temptations of sticky fingers, over-reaching, and self-dealing
as the government that seizes to build its own dreams.
A takings test turning upon whether the state practically confis-
cates property is closely akin to'doctrines of governmental tort liability.
Tort liability rules leave room for official policy choices that benefit
some to the detriment of others, 36 but liability is imposed if govern-
ment gains from a calculated choice inflicting physical damage on an-
other. 37 The typical case is one where government work is made easier
132. See E. HATCH, supra note 45, ch. 10 (discussing the work of B. MALINOWKSI, LAW
AND ORDER IN POLYNESIA 293-940 (1934), which points out that much of the chiefs' wealth
is redistributed).
133. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
134. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 62-67 (1974).
135. See Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 1083-89.
136. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at 35-36.
137. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956) (Navajo Indians may recover dam-
ages for deliberate destruction of their houses on federal lands by federal agents); Boyer,
Giterstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment. An Inter-
pretativeAnalysis, 54 N. CAR. L. REV. 497, 526-27 (1976).
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by the imposition of unasked-for risks upon its citizens. 138 In takings
cases, a comparable government benefit triggers compensation for the
appropriation of private property.
c. The social property and process themes
While the human property theme lies beneath the surface of con-
temporary takings doctrine, the social property concept is more easily
detectable. Many authors identify the deep historical roots of the real-
location themes in takings law.139 Indeed, several of the accepted de-
scriptive classifications of the takings cases (the nuisance, public trust,
and balancing tests) presuppose an uncompensated disgorging of val-
ues. The rationales are that the individual overreached and should be
required to give back what was seized; that the wealth previously was
committed to the public and that the individual's holdings are subject
to the preexisting claims; or that the individual's interests are vulnera-
ble to a utilitarian override or "balancing" against other concerns, a
calculus few entitlements can survive. One of the central enigmas of
takings law, which this Article has undertaken to clarify, has been the
reconciliation of these redistributive themes with the rights-protection
stance of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 140
The process theme of takings law is perhaps not as conspicuous as
the redistributive doctrine, but determined scholarship has brought it to
the surface. Courts are influenced in land use conflicts by legislative or
administrative linedrawing that is carefully tailored, flexible, and re-
sponsive to new insights.141 This attention to procedural nicety could
be decribed as another manifestation of the hard look doctrine, which
imposes an impressive regime of fair dealing upon a wide range of ad-
ministrative reallocative decisions.' 42 Professor Sax has written that
the point of the takings clause is to "spread the cost of operating the
governmental apparatus throughout the society rather than imposing it
upon some small segment of it." 143 This so-called equal protection per-
138. See Gellhorn & Laver, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1325 (1954).
139. See, e.g., Durham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 63; Stoebuck, supra note 88; Oakes,
supra note 126.
140. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See Oakes, supra note 126, at 607.
141. See Soper, supra note 68, at 70-71 ("By providing procedures to adjust regulations
on a case-by-case basis, and by carefully tailoring restrictions to keep them as closely com-
mensurate as possible to the problem that justifies the restrictions in the first place, the bur-
den on property owners can be reduced and the potential constitutional obstacle more easily
surmounted."). See, e.g., Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir.
1972).
142. See Rodgers, supra note 104.
143. Sax, supra note 134, at 75-76; see Sax, supra note 105, at 169-71.
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ception of takings has been extolled by influential writers, 144 and is
turning up in Supreme Court discussion of the taking issue. 145 It is
now part of the fair process regimen of takings doctrine to pay heed to
disparate treatment where a few are required to bear burdens that
should be spread more widely.
d Formulating a takings test. a search for official advantage
Having measured the themes of Part I against the authorities of
takings doctrine, we are now prepared to formulate a takings test. The
biological property theme manifests itself in protection of a core inter-
est against all legislative invasion as a matter of substantive due pro-
cess. Its central idea is that a minimal entitlement is necessary for
humans to grow and to prosper, and it uses biological ideas to mark the
point beyond which people are being pushed "too far."
The biological and social functionary themes mark the limits of
compensability by restricting justification for compensation to individ-
ual goals, singly or as a group. This leaves us with a takings test
requiring payment whenever the government improves its position by
taking over property. This takings test, call it a search for an official
advantage, approximates the rule of government tort liability where
damage ensues from direct confiscation or more subtle gain in official
convenience.
The social functionary and common property themes of Part I are
discernible in takings doctrine in the courts' endorsement of a broad
governmental authority to defeat individual wealth expectations be-
cause society will be better off. The descriptive mistake of many tak-
ings tests, unfortunately, is to expect too much of partial definitions of
this social property. The nuisance theory of taking, for example, is a
perfectly good partial explanation of property loss recognizing a social
qualification that can be revived when the occasion arises. Nuisance
law usually presupposes overreaching, however, and its redistributive
rationale is often one of correcting a wrong. Another type of social
property is natural resource wealth, which is to be understood under
the "common inheritance" theme as inviting redistributions not only to
correct past injustices but also to recognize the legitimacy of others'
claims.
We are left, then, with a circular definition of "social" property as
a wealth expectation that may be redefined legislatively without com-
pensation. It is true that individuals may carve holdings out of natural
resources, even to the point of presumed invulnerability associated with
144. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 34, at 97-98; B. ACKERMAN, supra note 33, at 51 n.22.
145. See, e.g., Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133-34
(1978).
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human property; the singular characteristic of natural resource wealth,
however, apparent to our early ancestors and to philosophers alike, is
that it is a gift resistant to the merit claims customarily made by
humans intent upon securing their position against their fellows.
With this takings test in hand, we will now examine a variety of
disputes involving resource usage over time. The Article continues the
search for the four themes of Part I. The public trust doctrine affords
useful insights into the procedural care expected to attend resource
reallocations and reflects the idea of a reallocable social wealth in a
resource commons. The reserved rights doctrine is helpful in defining
social and human property as well as in illuminating the services of
process protection. The law of waste addresses the crucial question of
intergenerational equity in the use and consumption of natural re-
sources; it provides a sensitive setting for evaluating the types of con-
straints upon present users associated with property perceived as a
natural resource commons.
B. Temporal Nuisances. A Search for Further Validation
1 Public Trust Doctrine
A strong version of sequential allocation is found in the state law
of public trust, which affirms that some types of natural resources are
held in trust by government for the benefit of the public. 146 This doc-
trine, while differing from state to state, demands of resource realloca-
tion decisions fair procedures, judgments carefully justified, and results
consistent with protection and perpetuation of the resource. 147 The
classic expression is in the Illinois Central case,148 involving the give-
away of the Chicago waterfront, where the reallocation of an important
public resource under suspect circumstances was repudiated by a later
legislature without payment of compensation. The public trust case
law supplements our theory on matters of process protection and the
."social" aspect of natural resource wealth.
a. The process right
The resources reached and the protections accorded by the public
trust doctrine are in flux, 149 but there is no doubt that the process fair-
146. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.16; Johnson, Public Trust Protectionfor Stream
Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 233 (1980); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Large,
This Landis Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039.
147. W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.16.
148. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Illinois Central is generally
recognized as a case illustrating the "navigable servitude." Bartke, Navigation Servitude and
Just Compensation-Strugglefor a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV. 1 (1968); Sax, supra note 146,
at 473.
149. See, e.g., Dunning, The Sign'fcance of California's Public Trust Easementfor Calf-
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ness restrictions attending resource reallocations in the cases are flour-
ishing. When a state government sets about to turn over publicly held
resources to the judgment of private managers, the courts insist rigor-
ously upon the process protections of disclosure, justification, and the
opportunity to be heard. °50 There are close parallels between the pub-
lic trust doctrine at the state level and the federal hard look doctrine of
judicial review. 15 ' This means that much of the due process baggage of
contemporary judicial review of agency actions (requiring findings,
consideration of alternatives, close study, explanations of methodology)
is carried over to public trust reallocation decisions. 5 2
Hard look review ordinarily is value neutral in that any potential
loser, whether exploiter or preserver, is extended the protection of rea-
soned decisionmaking.153 While there is no reason to believe that all
fornia's Water Rights Law, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 357, 396-98 (1980) (identifying several water
rights doctrines with a defacto consequence of diminishing consumptive use rights); Wilkin-
son, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 269 (1980).
150. See, e.g., Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
517 (1929) (requiring carefully drafted legislative leasing scheme); Gould v. Greylock Reser-
vation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (requiring explicit legislative en-
dorsement of a decision to reallocate a public park to a more restrictive private use); United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457
(N.D. 1976) (requiring study as a precondition to issuance of water withdrawal permits).
Generally, alienation of tidelands is not prohibited, but courts insist upon demonstration of
a legislative finding that such action is consistent with the purposes of the trust. Comment,
The Tideland Trust. Economic Currents in a Traditional Legal Doctrine, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
826, 830-31 (1974).
151. See W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.16.
152. On the hard look doctrine generally, see Rodgers, supra note 104, at 707-10.
153. Id. at 706-07; Wilkinson, supra note 149, at 310. The threshold question for process
protection in due process cases is whether the claimant is about to be disappointed by the
withdrawal of wealth. There is scant distinction, if the loss is evident, between strong enti-
tlement and weak needs claims. Commentary on the Supreme Court's recent procedural
due process jurisprudence stresses that the inquiry should focus upon whether the com-
plaining party has been deprived of something of value. See Monaghan, "Of 'Liberty' and
'Property,'" 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1977); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 749
(1964); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property". Adjudicative Due Process in the Admin-
istrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445 (1977). The Court nonetheless, chary of endorsing
too much fair process, is inclined to look closely at the substantive interest asserted, refusing
to extend due process protections to contract or property rights appropriately conditioned.
See O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 506 (1980) (residents of a nursing
home for the elderly have no right to a hearing on governmental revocation of home's au-
thority to provide them with publicly financed nursing care although revocation would re-
sult in transfer of patients to a different home); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (university teacher dismissed at end of one-year
probationary period; held not entitled to a review or appeal of his dismissal). Cases such as
Roth and O'Bannon are strong precedents for recognition of the conditional or provisional
nature of property rights in natural resources asserted in this article. After all, if Roth's
expectations about the security of his position as a teacher can be destroyed by reference to
the small print in the University rules, why cannot the wealth expectations of a timber com-
pany be destroyed by a comparable title defect or overriding understanding about the
"trust" nature of the holdings? Cf. Schulenberg v. Harriman, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 44 (1874)
(reading narrowly reversion conditions for non-compliance with federal railroad land
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types of potential losses must be attended by the same procedural
agenda, there is reason to believe that any substantial disappointment
must be justified procedurally. This means in public trust cases that
process rights will not turn upon nice questions of whether the losses
confronted are compensable takings.' 54 Consequently, even losers of
conditional wealth in the "commons" are protected procedurally,
which is a welcome outcome. Fairness in decisionmaking can be
spread more widely than fair shares of scarce goods. 55
There is a strong idea, in some of the public trust cases, that con-
trol of the resource (by actual administration, close oversight, or other-
wise) should remain in the hands of a public body. 156 Here is a
component of contemporary process significance built around deterring
delegation. The principal objections to broad delegations are proce-
dural: standards are missing, and a lack of standards invites capricious
and discriminatory administration and a misunderstanding of gov-
erning rules.15 7
b. Social limits in natural resource property
Substantive as well as procedural constraints appear in public trust
cases. It is plausible to read the public trust servitude as reaching all
natural resources and subjecting them to a strongly protective use re-
gime. 158 So read, the public trust doctrine, like the law of'waste, in-
cludes a universal "good husbandry" constraint, which can be enforced
without compensation for losses of value.159 Public trust law is perhaps
the strongest contemporary expression of the idea that the legal rights
grants); Comment, The Obligation to Reforest Private Land Under the Washington Forest
Practices Act, 56 WASH. L. REV. 717 (1981). Conditional wealth arguments have considera-
ble appeal in the context of wealth reallocations in a resource-limited world, but less so in
the context of whether a potential candidate for a sacrificial contribution should be dealt
with fairly (given notice, opportunity to be heard, and explanations) prior to a cutback of
expectations.
154. The process rights set forth in United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976), for example, do not depend
upon the complaining party's ability to demonstrate a deprivation of vested rights by the
export of water from North Dakota.
155. See Rodgers, supra note 49, at 227.
156. See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 387; Sax, supra note 146 at
485-89, 508-09, 562.
157. See Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971)
(Levanthal, J.).
158. See W. RODGERS, supra note 56, at § 2.16; Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine
from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C.D.L. REV. 185, 188-89 (1980) (suggesting that the func-
tion of the doctrine is to protect against destabilizing change).
159. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) is commonly cited
for this proposition, despite the skeptical empirical analysis of Bryden, .4 Phantom Doctrine.-
The Origins and Effects ofJust v. MarMetie County, 1978 AM. BAR. FOUNDATION RESEARCH
J. 397. See also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956).
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of nature and of future generations are enforceable against contempo-
rary users.
Public trust law contains an insistent distributive theme, reminis-
cent of the philosophical support for a resource "commons,"1 60 that the
benefits of natural resource wealth should be disseminated to the pub-
lic. The idea of public benefit alone, however, does not account for the
public trust doctrine's strong anti-delegation tone,' 6' insisting that the
protection of public uses is prima facie incompatible with nonpublic
management. Spreading benefits to the public is one thing, insisting
upon public management is quite another. Presumably it is an empiri-
cal question to ask what combination of public and private manage-
ment is compatible with getting the most out of the resource by the
means desired.' 62 The public management tilt in the case law, how-
ever, can be vindicated another way. One consequence of continuing
public management of resource wealth is that no distribution ever
would be permanent (i.e., through sale or grant) because reallocation
by the manager, at a later time under different circumstances, would be
possible. A recognition of a provisional "social" wealth derived from
natural resources, subject to legislative redefinition, achieves a compa-
rable purpose. 163
Another interpretation of the anti-delegation theme of public trust
160. See supra Section I.C.
161. See supra note 156. The classical view, however, has not forbidden dispositions of
public lands. Wilkinson, supra note 149, at 305.
162. See Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to
Water, in 1 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 193-202 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
163. Historically, for understandable reasons considerable controversy has arisen over
the question of whether legislative grants or contracts are binding in perpetuity against fu-
ture legislatures. Cunningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Develop-
ment Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625 (1978); Hagman, Estoppel and Vesting in the Age of
Multi-Land Use Permits, 115 W.V.L. REV. 545 (1979); Hochman, The Supreme Court andthe
Constitutionality ofRetroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960); Merrill, Application
ofthe Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 639, 665 (1932)
(urging "that the power to make regulations for the general welfare, in all of its manifesta-
tions, is not a legitimate subject of contract"); id. at 662 (suggesting that the Dartmouth
College case, Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819), may be obsolete); see
Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1918) (right of eminent domain may not
be waived by contract); Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 17 U.S. 659 (1876)
(power to regulate pollution control not waived by municipal franchise); cf. Charles River
Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 419 (1837). But see New Orleans Gas
Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885) (can withdraw fifty year exclusive franchise
only by paying compensation); Superior Water, Lt. & Power Co. v. Superior, 263 U.S. 125
(1923) (an agreement by a city to purchase a water plant at a price to be determined by set
means at the end of a fixed period excludes the right to acquire it by eminent domain).
A good test case would be for Congress to enact a statute declaring that each citizen has
a "vested right" to ambient air quality adequate to protect health. Would this form of enact-
ment effectively extend constitutional protection to environmental quality, permitting subse-
quent repeal only upon payment of compensation? If not, what distinguishes industrial
property rights in, say, offshore oil resources? See Union Oil Co. v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743
(9th Cir. 1975).
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law stresses the empirical (and perhaps ideological) judgment there
presumed that unfettered private management of some types of re-
sources is poorly suited to achieve two fundamental policy aims-the
protection of future generations and the avoidance of spillover costs
within a single generation.1 64 Inter- and intragenerational friction-
avoidance can be achieved also by allowing legislatures freedom to al-
locate in response to new values and empirical insight while denying
them the power to delegate those decisions inperpetuity. Thus the anti-
delegation theme of public trust law is consistent with a view of the
state as a conflict-adjuster, not a wealth-accumulator. Public holdings
are not supposed to be ends in themselves but only the means to assure
fair distributions today and tomorrow.
Ultimately the anti-delegation tone of public trust law is not expli-
cable in utilitarian terms of maximizing productivity over time. It rep-
resents instead a commitment to maintaining resource wealth in
common over time, and maintaining it in renewable form. This is an
absolutist idea, and it coincides with historical and philosophical per-
ceptions of a resource commons perpetually open to satisfy the claims
of this and. coming generations. 65 Thus, just as some private wealth is
immune from public confiscation, 66 the trust doctrine protects some
public wealth from private confiscation.
2. Reserved Rights Doctrine
A second type of temporal resource conflict, far removed doctri-
nally but close in conception to the public trust cases, arises in the con-
text of the federal law of reserved rights. These contests occur when
the federal government fixes a regime of use rights in natural resources,
with a competing group of users arriving later in time, often with the
explicit approval of state regulators. Water and fishing rights alloca-
tions are prototypical. 67 While the facts are often complex, what hap-
pens in essence is that the federal government assigns "ownership" of
the resource to Group A, then the state comes along to assign "owner-
ship" rights in the same resource to Group B. The result is a Hobbes-
ian arrangement of overlapping claims, which can be perceived as a
zero-sum conflict between claimants. Quite clearly, some investment-
164. Alexander, Human Values and Economists' Values, in HUMAN VALUES AND Eco-
NOMIC POLICY (S. Hook ed. 1967); Fried, Difficulties in the Economic Analysis of Rights, in
MARKETS AND MORALS 175 (G. Bermant, P. Brown, & G. Dworkin eds. 1977); Hobin, Jus-
tice and Future Generations, 6 PHILOS. & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 70 (1976).
165. See supra Section I.C.
166. See supra Section I.A.
167. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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backed expectations are in for a disappointment and some government
promises are about to be broken.
Federal reserved rights conflicts clarify further three dimensions of
a comprehensive taking theory: the concept of provisional "social"
wealth subject to uncompensated value reductions; process protections
associated with reallocation decisions; and minimal "human" property
rights immune from legislative divestiture.
a. Provisional wealth
Although federal reserved rights are at the heart of contemporary
natural resource controversies throughout the western United States,
the temporal structure of these disputes permits a simple doctrinal solu-
tion. With the federal government acting first and controlling the out-
come under the Supremacy Clause, 68 the only serious question
requires consultation of the legislative materials to determine whether
the national authorities have made an allocation decision. 169 Affixation
of the "servitude" imposed by the reservation of rights defeats expecta-
tion, reliance, and entitlement arguments, and the loser who can put
the resource to a better use is free to persuade the rights holder of that
fact. The defacto ousters at least potentially sanctioned by the law of
federal reserved rights are enormous; for example, a good percentage of
state water rights are subject to preexisting federal reservations that, if
enforced, would effect vast transfers of wealth without transgressing
taking limitations. 70
Consider, by way of illustration, several of the Northwest Indian
treaties, negotiated by the United States during territorial days of the
1850's, which secure the rights of several tribes to take fish at their
usual and accustomed grounds and stations, "in common with" citizens
of the territory.' 7' Over the years, the tribes who fish in the
rivermouths located at the terminals of ocean migration routes of the
spawning salmon gradually fell victim to earlier appropriation by tech-
nologically superior nontreaty fishermen. The tribes' unfavorable geo-
graphical position, coupled with unusually discriminatory and hostile
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
169. See, e.g. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978); Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575-76
(1908); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905).
170. Despite this potentiality, a noted water law scholar stresses that instances of actual
divestiture of state-secured water rights are nearly nonexistent. Trelease, Federal Reserved
Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENVER L.J. 473 (1977). For an indication that non-Indian
federal reserved rights also pose no great threat to state development decisions, see Trelease,
Uneasy Federalism-Slate Water Laws and National Water Uses, 55 WASH. L. REV. 751
(1980).
171. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 674 (1979). (The author served as counsel of record in this case.)
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state law enforcement, 172 resulted in a severe reduction, often a com-
plete cessation, of Indian fishing. Recent court decisions have rectified
that imbalance to a degree, reallocating fishing oportunities and thus
posing the issues of immediate interest here. 173
In the first place, it is clear that no user of the resource may ac-
quire wealth by destroying spawning fish necessary to assure renewal of
the stocks. 174 Thus, conservation laws, destructive as they are of expec-
tations and provisional wealth, are enforceable, taking claims to the
contrary notwithstanding. 175 One interesting feature of the fishing cul-
ture is that restraints imposed for the benefits of future generations
(conservation closures) seem to be accepted far more readily than re-
straints imposed for the benefit of another user group (allocation clo-
sures). 176 There are, of course, ethical differences between sacrificing
for the future and for the present; perhaps fishermen are more likely to
feel an obligation to extend a helping hand to the unborn than to the
present generation, which is seen as capable of taking care of itself. For
future generations, there is an ethic of protection, for the present, an
ethic of competition. Sacrifices for the future also are undertaken by
everybody (all people fishing are ordered to cease, although some may
be hit harder than others), and thus lack the disparity of treatment so
apparent in transfers of opportunity from one existing user group to
another. Conceivably, then, it is more palatable ethically, and feasible
politically, to shift resource usage to future generations through conser-
vation requirements than to reallocate opportunities for the present. 177
More than one observer has been charged with loving fellow humans in
the abstract while despising the people he knows.
With the future protected, and the costs of doing so imposed ini-
tially on existing user groups, further allocation issues are intragenera-
tional. Under the reserved rights doctrine, compensation is not
required for cutbacks imposed on nontreaty users for the benefit of
tribal fishermen. Nontreaty appropriations, and investments built
around them, were always subject to the preexisting federal "servitude"
imposed by treaties. 78 These nontreaty appropriations constitute con-
172. Some of the details are reported in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312,
389-99 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
173. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 686.
174. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1977) (Puyallup III).
175. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968) (Puyallup I); Dep't of
Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1973) (Puyallup II).
176. This opinion is based on experience as counsel to the Puyallup Tribe during several
years of litigation in the Western Washington fishing cases.
177. Sacrifices for the future might be perceived to have a greater contributive impact,
inviting reuse again and again. Such sacrifices also yield more problematical benefits be-
cause beneficiaries and their needs are unknown.
178. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198
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ditional or defeasible wealth in the clearest sense. Divestitures, how-
ever, could be called an expression of corrective justice only upon a
severe misreading of expectations; nontreaty users who gained at the
expense of the tribes did so with strong official endorsement, 179 and can
hardly be characterized as wrongdoers. I80 Rather, the reallocation
comes closer to being an example of distributive or contributive justice,
withdrawing wealth because it is required to fulfill the needs of
others. '8'
The treaty fishing cases offer insight on the upper limits as well as
the lower limits of resource wealth accumulation. In the Northwest
fishing cases, the Supreme Court approved an allocation formula divid-
ing treaty and nontreaty shares equally, l8 2 so long as it was subject to
downward adjustments in tribal opportunities not required to sustain
"a moderate living."' 8 3 The court wrote:
If, for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few members, or if it
should find other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries,
a 45% or 50% allocation of an entire run that passes through its custo-
mary fishing ground would be manifestly inappropriate because the
livelihood of the tribe under those circumstances could not reasonably
require an allotment of [a] large number of fish.' 84
This is an extraordinary observation on income distribution, and its
implications should not be ignored. One interpretation'8 5 of this lan-
guage is that property values in common resources, however firmly
based in entitlement theories, may be redistributed without compensa-
tion whenever the wealth of the rights holders exceeds "moderate"
levels. There is not even a requirement in this fishing formula that the
U.S. 371 (1905). Thus, the restoration of previously assigned wealth is an example of rectifi-
cation or even reparations. See B. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); D.
PHILLIPS, EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND RECTIFICATION: AN EXPLORATION OF NORMATIVE SO-
CIOLOGY 101-08 (1979).
179. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 668-69 (1979).
180. The tribes' success in the Northwest treaty fishing litigation did not depend upon
proof of knowledge or participation by nontreaty fishermen who benefitted from state ac-
tions restricting treaty fishing. See id. at 669 n.14.
181. See id. at 678-79:
Because the Indians had always exercised the right to meet their subsistence and
commercial needs by taking fish from treaty area waters, they would be unlikely to
perceive a "reservation" of that right as merely the chance, shared with millions of
other citizens, occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial waters.
182. Id. at 685.
183. Id at 686.
184. Id. at 687.
185. Another is that the scope of the right secured by the treaties is defined by moderate
living needs and that no redistribution is presumed. The treaty, however, makes no mention
of such a constraint on the rights it secures. In fact, according to the Court, "when the
treaties were negotiated, neither party realized or intended that their agreement would deter-
mine whether, and if so how, a resource that had always been thought inexhaustible would
be allocated ... when it later became scarce." Id at 669.
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wealth transfers go from rich Indians to poor non-Indians. It is enough
if the Indians become "too rich." Thus no compensation is to be ex-
pected for wealth losses attributable to reservations for future genera-
tions (under fishing conservation laws) or for reallocations for this
generation trimming away extravagances unnecessary for a "moderate"
living. '8 6
Yet a policy of "moderate living," while coming as a surprise in
the world of regulation, may have more credible expression in the pro-
gressive income tax laws. Acceptance of a "moderate living" standard
above which exists a taxable excess offers a new way of looking at the
taking issue. It suggests a theoretical support for uncompensated value
reductions that includes not only corrective justice (one cannot fairly
take what is previously committed to others) but also contributive jus-
tice (one cannot fairly keep more than is necessary for comfortable sus-
tenance). The corrective justice underpinning turns upon the
legitimacy of expectations, while the contributive justice rationale is
satisfied by a showing that the loser can exist "moderately" well
notwithstanding losses inflicted by the tax or regulation. 187
We should not be surprised at this dual support for uncompen-
sated value reductions in natural resources property expectations. Cor-
rective and contributive justice are at the heart of the paradigms of just
losses, earlier addressed. 18 Furthermore, Locke's proviso and the per-
186. Not surprisingly, the Burger Court's aversion to excessive accumulations of re-
source wealth is highly selective, as two examples from the 1979-80 term illustrate. In An-
drus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657 (1980), the Court upheld Shell Oil's claims as vested and
thus exempt from the leasing requirements of the Mineral Leasing Act. Imagine the reac-
tion if the Court had embraced as the test of a vested right not the incidents of entitlement
surrounding the company's oil shale claims but rather whether Shell's earnings exceeded the
test of "moderate" wealth. In Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352 (1980), the Court held that
large farms had present perfected water rights under the Boulder Canyon Project Act and
thus were immune from the acreage limitations of federal reclamation law. One wonders,
had the Court detected rights "in common" to water resources in the Valley, whether it
would have confidently reached the conclusion that the only water rights that vested under
the Act were conditioned by a standard of "moderate living"-that is, were subject to the
acreage limitations. This idea of disgusting wealth is hardly contagious.
187. The windfall profits tax upon rapidly inflating petroleum values is illustrative. The
wealth holders' claims of merit are dubious, and their entitlement claims to a natural re-
source are subject to the "common" expectations of others. Rising prices strengthen users'
claims of need. Progressive income taxes, however, are ordinarily justified by the declining
marginal utility of the extra aiollar in the hands of the wealthy. Presumably one would have
to be very rich to assign no value to income above a certain level; for many years, the
maximum federal tax rate on ordinary income was seventy percent. Justification of the con-
fiscation of all income above "moderate" levels must rest upon other grounds. One possible
ground is that one's needs (or entitlements or deserts) have been satisfied and the surplus is
required for the satisfaction of others' needs. See D. MILLER, SOCIAL JUSTICE 148 (1976),
commenting on the justice differences between a society where needs are first satisfied, with
any surplus being distributed by national lottery, and a society in which everything goes into
the lottery.
188. See supra section II.A.2.a.
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ception of a natural resource commons are strong ideas conveying the
sense of a ceiling above which exclusionary rights may not be
perfected. 189
b. Process and minimal rights protection
Another issue in the reserved rights fishing cases is the extent to
which "takings" law protects the rights granted to Indians by the trea-
ties. If, indeed, rights in "common" may be adjusted by the legislature
either way without compensation,' 90 then these treaty rights are se-
verely compromised.191 The illustrations discussed here have both pro-
cess and substantive rights connotations.
One would suspect that sharp reallocations of fishing opportunities
from the treaty minority into the hands of the nontreaty majority
would run into close scrutiny in the courts under various rationales.
92
That in fact has happened. Under a fair process analysis courts have
given short shrift to state practices that exclude Indians entirely in
favor of non-Indian users, 193 impose "conservation" closures on treaty
fishing alone,' 94 or repeal the state laws of theft insofar as Indian fish-
ing equipment is concerned. 195
Are these ideas of process rectitude and equal treatment sufficient
to protect Indians from unfair reallocation of the right to fish? A
respected author has insisted, after all, that the point of the takings
clause is to "spread the cost of operating the governmental apparatus
throughout the society rather than imposing it upon some small seg-
ment of it." 196 The idea of spreading the costs of running the govern-
ment makes most sense, however, in a context where the state is
pursuing its own business, such as building highways or providing for
its armies. 197 Where the government acts to adjust private rights, the
189. See supra notes 20-25 & accompanying text; supra Section I.C.
190. See Sax, supra note 105, at 153-55.
191. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905):
[I]t was decided [below] that the Indians acquired no rights but what any inhabit-
ant of the Territory or State would have. Indeed, acquired no rights but such as
they would have without the treaty. This is certainly an impotent outcome to nego-
tiations and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the word of the
Nation for more.
192. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword- In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court.
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Perry, Modern Equal
Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979); Simson, A
Method of Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 663 (1977); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three
Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
193. See Dep't of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup If).
194. Id
195. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 418 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (requir-
ing return of fishing gear seized in enforcement actions).
196. Sax, supra note 134, at 75-76; see Sax, supra note 105, at 169-71.
197. Sax, supra note 134, at 64-67. See also Stoebuck, supra note 88.
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issue embraces not the resources needed to run a government but rather
the resources needed to sustain a society. It is one thing to spread the
costs of operating the government, and quite another to make amends
for all disappointments occasioned by shifts of wealth among private
parties. 198
Equal protection is an especially poor guide for evaluating the
lower limits of reallocations of Indian treaty fishing rights. Equal treat-
ment of Indians negates the benefits of the treaties, as state advocates
have pointed out for most of this century. 199 Predictably, courts have
gone well beyond the acknowledgment of process rights and identified
a substantive right to fish and support human needs in the commit-
ments bound up in the treaties. 2°° That is to say, the treaty tribes' right
to take fish assures not only fair treatment but also full stomachs. 20'
This fishing interest, call it a property right, is at the heart of the tribal
members' cultural and physical subsistence. Whatever the content of
this right, it does not appear to be honored by replacing it with a liabil-
ity right permitting divestiture upon payment of dollar damages.
20 2
Indian fishing rights also can be viewed as core property rights
supported by the considerations of biological property theory.
20 3
Human property rights can be defined as entitlements necessary for
198. Understandably, therefore, absent a perceived impact on fundamental rights or po-
litically weak minorities, courts have been quite tolerant of economic redistribution meas-
ures appearing as taxation, regulatory, or zoning decisions. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (sustaining land use planning
measure) ("Appellants . . . will share with other owners the benefits and burdens of the
city's exercise of its police power").
199. Compare United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1905) with Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20
(1979). See also Johnson & Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587
(1979).
200. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 679 (1979).
201. See also D. MILLER, supra note 187 (discussing justice theories of deserts, entitle-
ments, and needs).
202. Indian reserved rights are often discussed in terms of a "needs" analysis, see, e.g.,
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 595-601 (1963), suggesting human property rights not
subject to utilitarian override.
203. See supra Section I.A. The treaty fishing cases draw distinctions between treaty
subsistence and commercial fishing. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Pas-
senger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 684-85 (1979) (dictum). We are here concerned
not with the question of permissible uncompensated value reduction in the commercial right
but rather with the issue of whether the subsistence right, and perhaps some part of the
commercial right, should be revocable at all even with the payment of compensation. Pro-
posals have been made to divest some Northwest tribes, upon payment of compensation, of
all commercial rights to take anadromous steelhead trout, a popular sports fish. S. 874, 97th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1981). These proposals largely would reallocate wealth from a small group
of poor Indians to a large group of not-so-poor non-Indians. For the reasons stated in the
text, it can be argued that a vote to confiscate treaty subsistence fishing is a denial of Indian
rights and is unjust regardless of whether compensation is offered.
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human survival or fulfillment. 2 4 Human property protects the individ-
ual against the demands of the social group, and it is not susceptible to
utilitarian override.20 5 Human property would include resources satis-
fying intrinsic human needs-health, abode, personal belongings and
tools. Thus defined, it also would include Indian subsistence fishing.
3. Law of Waste
The law of waste imposes a duty on the occupants of land to re-
frain from impairing another's future interest in it. In examining this
doctrine, we confront the sharing obligations implicit in the idea that
many people over time hold natural resource wealth "in common."
The shaky empirical foundations of much legal theory is never
more evident than when it is put to use on the issue of the obligation to
share natural resources with those coming later. Economic analysis,
tied as it is to dollar votes in existing markets, severely discounts the
interests of the future.20 6 Suggestions of limits to growth, with severe
consequences for those not yet born,20 7 are met by optimistic projec-
tions of technological change and a durable belief in human initia-
tive.20 8 Rawls recommends that the first generation pass along
accumulated wealth plus some unspecified "saving. °20 9 This hollow
advice has been subject to widely differing interpretations, 210 and it
begs for empirical insights into why people share and whether they are
inclined to set aside wealth for those coming later.2t ' It assumes a
growing pie akin to that posited by classical economic theory.
204. See J. FEINBERG, THE NATURE AND VALUE OF RIGHTS, IN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND
THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 143 (1980). Cf. E. SCHUMACHER,
SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL (1973); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolution-
ary America, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 467, 479-81 (1976).
205. See J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN
(1975); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
206. See, e.g., T. PAGE, CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1977); Krier, The
Irrational NationalAir Quality Standards.- Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
323, 334 n.34 (1974). See also R. DUBOS, A GOD WITHIN 106 (1977).
207. D. MEADOWS et al., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972); M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL,
MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974). See also Coburn, Pessimism and Morality, in
PHILOSOPHY NOW (K. & P. Struhl eds. 1975).
208. See W. BECKERMAN, Two CHEERS FOR THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1975); G.
GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981); H. LANDSBERG, Growth and Resources, in NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MINERAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT A31 (1975)
(app. to Section I); Solow, The Economics of Resources or Resources of Economics, 64 AM.
Ec. REV. 1 (1974); Simon, Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad
News, 208 SCIENCE 1431 (1980).
209. J. RAWLS, supra note 3, at § 44; see id. at §§ 45, 46.
210. Compare G. HARDIN, THE LIMITS OF ALTRUISM: AN ECOLOGIST'S VIEW OF SUR-
VIVAL 79 (1977) with B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A LIBERAL STATE (1980), J. PASS-
MORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE 78-80, 86-88 (1974) and Williams, Running Out."
The Problem of Exhaustible Resources, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIES 165, 181 (1978).
211. See, e.g., Hamilton, The Genetic Evolution of Social Behavior, 7 J. THEORETICAL
BIOLOGY 1 (1964); Trivers, supra note 64, at 35.
[Vol. 10:205
TAKINGS THEORY
Perhaps the best illustrations of sequential conflict over natural re-
sources are those involving present and future interests in the same par-
cel. These disputes are litigated commonly under the law of waste,
which defines proper custody of a holding and use restrictions associ-
ated with it, to assure fulfillment of obigations to those coming later.
212
Not surprisingly, the standard of behavior is that of "reasonableness,"
which is the allocation language long associated with spatial
nuisances.213
The important point for our purposes is that waste law, which ad-
dresses the obligatory sharing of a limited resource, necessarily re-
strains present users for the benefit of those coming later. Thus, sundry
assaults against the long run productivity of the parcel, by loss of top-
soil, destruction of watercourses, and elimination of vegetation, have
been forbidden in waste litigation. 214 A standard of "good husbandry"
is often invoked, sometimes even to forbid changes in land use (for
example, from forestry to agriculture) that presage improved produc-
tivity in the short run.215 While it would be inaccurate to say that the
law of waste generally forbids consumptive use, such as mining, some
consumptive uses are forbidden, 216 and those that proceed can do so
only by accommodating the anticipated needs of later users.
The waste cases support recognition of a universal "good hus-
bandry" use restriction on all natural resources. 217 The cases effect un-
212. For an introduction, see W. RODGERS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENERGY &
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 345-64 (1979).
213. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 139 (1936).
214. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (destruction of
fishing opportunities) (dictum); Berns Constr. Co. v. Highley, 332 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1964)
(removal of dirt and gravel); Hickman v. Mulder, 58 Cal. App. 3d 900, 130 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1976) (failure to preserve citrus trees and vines); Chapel v. Hull, 60 Mich. 167, 26 N.W. 874
(1886) (overtillage of farm); Threatt v. Rushing, 361 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1978) (cutting of
timber).
215. See, e.g., Campion v. McLeod, 108 Ga. App. 261, 132 S.E.2d 848 (1963); Threatt v.
Rushing, 361 So. 2d 329 (Miss. 1978); see Lee v. Weerda, 124 Wash. 168, 213 P. 919 (1923)
(distinguishing ill husbandry from waste).
216. See United States v. Gear, 44 U.S. 120 (1845) (new mine constitutes waste); United
States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (destruction of fishing opportunities)
(dictum); Berns Constr. Co. v. Highley, 332 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1964) (removal of dirt and
gravel); Hickman v. Mulder, 58 Cal. App. 3d 900, 130 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1976) (failure to
preserve citrus trees and vines); Halifax Drainage Dist. v. Gleaton, 137 Fla. 397, 188 So. 374
(1939) (dredging and removing marsh and dirt from shorelands); Chapel v. Hull, 60 Mich.
167, 26 N.W. 874 (1886) (overtillage of farm); Threatt v. Rushing, 361 So. 2d 329 (Miss.
1978) (cutting of timber).
Moreover, the waste cases are strongly protective of the life tenants' subsistence uses-
for example, cutting timber for firewood or to make repairs. See, e.g., Campion v. McLeod,
108 Ga. App. 261, 132 S.E.2d 848 (1963); Threatt v. Rushing, supra; Lee v. Weerda, 124
Wash. 168, 213 P. 919 (1923) (distinguishing ill husbandry from waste). This confirms a
nonutilitarian human property right protected by courts in resource allocation judgments.
217. N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, ENERGY AND ECONOMIC MYTHS: INSTITUTIONAL AND
ANALYTICAL ECONOMIC ESSAYS (1976); J. RIVKIN, ENTROPY: A NEW WORLD VIEW (1980);
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compensated income transfers from one generation to the next honored
by law because an accidental circumstance (typically, the desire of a
testator) creates common claims to a parcel of resources. Yet these oc-
casional pockets of conflict in the law of real property or mortgage ap-
proach universal application. If the legislature is free to enforce the
word of a testator long since dead, surely it can honor the needs of
those not yet born; and if present resource users may be conscripted to
contribute to the first cause, it is not apparent why they must be passed
over as contributors to the second.
A biological explanation of law protecting future generations is
not entirely satisfactory. People are inclined to discount the benefits of
future resources, especially when under extreme duress. 218 At the same
time, they have children and make sacrifices for them. A biological
approximation of human behavior between related individuals is that
resources will be used by the present generation if they can support
more fitness now than they could later.219 In zero-sum cases (where
gains to one party are losses to another), this biological sharing rule
would discourage extravagant consumption at the expense of later sub-
sistence consumption. It would discourage destruction of renewable re-
sources, absent a showing of strong necessity.220 These results conform,
coincidentally, to the use regimes suggested by the stronger aspirations
of the law of waste and the public trust doctrine.221
Daly, supra note 41; Daly, The Steady-State Economy" Toward a Political Economy of Bio-
physical Equilibrium and Moral Growth, in TOWARD A STEADY-STATE ECONOMY 149, 152
(1973).
218. See G. HARDIN, supra note 210, at 79, 128; LUMSDEN & WILSON, supra note 2, at
88.
219. See supra note 65; R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE ch. 5 (1976). See also N.
TANNER, ON BECOMING HUMAN (1981) (stressing that the gathering innovation, largely a
female initiative to protect the next generation, was a key evolutionary step for human be-
ings). See also H. FISHER, THE SEX CONTRACT: THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
(1982). For the appealing suggestion that group selection results in social conventions re-
stricting population growth with consequent benefits for remote future generations, see V.
WYNNE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL DISPERSION IN RELATION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1962), dis-
cussed critically in Irons, Is Yomot Social Behavior Adaptive?, in SOCIOBIOLOGY: BEYOND
NATURE/NURTURE? 417 (G. Barlow & J. Silverberg eds. 1980) (AAAS Selected Sympo-
sium 35).
220. See, e.g., N.'GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, THE ENTROPY LAW AND THE ECONOMIC PRO-
CESS 21 (1971) ("any use of natural resources for nonvital needs means a smaller quantity of
life in the future. If we understand well the problem, the best use of our iron resources is to
produce plows or harrows as they are needed, not Rolls Royces, nor even agricultural trac-
tors"); N. GEORGESCU-ROEGEN, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem, in ENERGY
AND ECONOMIC MYTHS: INSTITUTIONAL AND ANALYTICAL ECONOMIC ESSAYS 53, 59
(1976). As put by John Ruskin, "what one person has, another cannot have; and ... every
atom of substance, of whatever kind, used or consumed, is so much human life spent; which,
if it issue in the saving present life, or gaining more, is well spent, but if not is either so much
life prevented, or so much slain." UNTO THIS LAST: FOUR ESSAYS ON THE FIRST PRINCI-
PLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 96 (L. Hubenka ed. 1967).
221. While I have not investigated the question, my guess would be that the law of waste
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Another line of biological argument in support of a duty to future
generations stems from the nature of the expectations directed at a re-
source "commons." 222 The common property theme, and the modest
aims of individual appropriation associated with it, arose out of the
realities of a low-technology age. Sharing with future generations was
a necessity, dictated not so much by moral imperative as by the lack of
tools to do otherwise. Does a resource allocation based upon a long-
standing status quo become a moral obligation to refrain if one party
acquires the means to reallocate? It is sufficient to say, perhaps, that
property is a conservative institution, and its theoretical plumage long
has reflected the goal of protecting settled expectations. 223 Waste and
public trust law protect property expectations that have arisen in large
part because of people's historical inability to claim the commons.
CONCLUSION
This Article sets out to construct a takings theory borrowing from
four prominent themes of property justification-biological and social
functionary, common property, and process. This theory has been re-
ferred to as biological not because dark human impulses predetermine
rules of law but rather because the rules that emerge are explicable in
terms of a coherent view of human nature conforming to contemporary
biological theory. There is no attempt here to elevate biology into an
all-encompassing explanation of law although it is believed that biolog-
ical explanations are too much neglected in human affairs where actors
are motivated by strong biological concerns such as self-preservation or
kin-protection. 224
While loose terms always are disposed to fit predetermined molds,
the fourfold theory offered here corresponds reasonably well with the
doctrinal experiences used to test the theory. The five doctrines used
for testing purposes (nuisance, takings, public trust, reserved rights, and
waste) are but a small constellation in the universe of property law,
even natural resource property law, but they are nonetheless important
doctrines, and ones, moreover, having superficially little to do with
each other. At least something can be said for a theory bringing forth
connecting threads of similarity in rules of different origins.
would be more likely to involve related individuals than would the law of public trust. It is
conjectural, but interesting nonetheless, to suggest that the factor of relatedness might move
the courts in waste cases closer to a regime of no significant deterioration for resource use.
The situation is complicated in waste cases because the party creating the split estate often
would be moved by considerations of kinship or friendship.
222. See supra Section I.C.
223. See Michelman, supra note 14.
224. See Beckstron, Sociobiology and Intestate Wealth Transfers, 76 NORTHWESTERN
U.L. REV. 216 (198 1); Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered- The Role of Rationality in Tort,
Theory, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1980).
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Can this theory be applied to other subjects of property law? The
property justifications from which the theory is derived are not the ex-
clusive domain of natural resources. Perhaps, then, the powerful
themes of biological service or process right would turn up in every
conceivable property arrangement from copyright to homestead laws.
Any line between mine, thine, and ours at least would invite a search
for manifestations of the four themes identified here.
To a greater degree, however, the property justifications invoked
here are peculiar to property rights in natural resources. The "common
property" theme is the most obvious example, although the ideas of
process right and biological justification (as in the case of the subsis-
tence fisher or farmer) also are expressed with particular force in natu-
ral resource property contexts. All the doctrines invoked here to
validate the theory are peculiar to the allocation of natural resources,
so what we are left with is a natural resources property theory.
There appears little to distinguish the examples set forth here from
many others in natural resources law. The same four theoretical
themes should extend to allocation disputes concerning a wide variety
of resources, both renewable and nonrenewable (fish and shellfish, air
and water, timber, mineral and soil resources). It is expected that these
theoretical themes would appear in a variety of doctrinal specialties
(eminent domain, land use regulation, the interpretation of leases, the
contract clause, water and oil and gas law), linking perhaps even do-
mestic and international law of resource allocation.225
While a religiously-derived natural law can be said to have come
and gone, there is something to be said for starting the inquiry into
property rights with a perception of a person that approximates the one
the law is supposed to serve. Bringing people back into property law
suggests lines between the human property of mine and thine, paying
close attention to what we are as people. It suggests a definition of
social property, which serves the group side of our nature and condi-
tions the individual claim with the cultural expectation. It points to a
mode of process for distinguishing between permissible disappoint-
ments and impermissible frustrations, which we call injustice. It turns
out that people are individuals and social beings, and that property
serves their preferences in both capacities. That much of the work of
the courts can be read to validate these distinctions proclaims a grow-
ing receptivity to this new natural law.
225. See M'Gonigle, The "Economizing" of Ecology. Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9
ECOLOGY L.Q. 120, 218 (1980).
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